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 Abstract 
 
Despite plenty of studies on the process of rent and vacancy adjustment in the office 
market, very few examine the role of transaction costs in the adjustment process.   
This study investigates how transaction costs affect the dynamic of rent and vacancy 
adjustment in response to external shocks using empirical data from Hong Kong.  We 
hypothesize that an increase in transaction costs will lead to slower rent adjustment 
but faster vacancy adjustment.  Without transaction costs, rent will immediately adjust 
to a new equilibrium level under external shocks and vacancy rate will always be 
equal to the natural vacancy rate.   With positive transaction costs, both rent and 
vacancy rate will change in response to external shocks.  Therefore deviation of 
vacancy rate from the natural vacancy rate is a transaction cost phenomenon.    
 
Although we cannot measure transaction costs in the office rental market precisely, 
we can easily rank them according to the quality (or Grade) of the offices.  We argue 
that transaction costs per unit rental space of low-end offices (Grade C) are higher 
compared with that of high-end offices (Grade A).  This difference in transaction 
costs mainly arise from different degree of information asymmetry about the quality 
of tenant (quality of high-end office tenants are easier to assess) and quality of office 
space (quality of high-end office buildings are easier to assess), and higher search cost 
per unit rental space for low-end office buildings.   Since transaction costs relative to 
rental value of low-end and high-end offices can easily ranked, one implication of our 
hypothesis is that rental levels of low-end offices are less sensitive to external shocks.  
In contrast, the vacancy rates of low-end offices are more responsive to external 
shocks.   
 
These empirical implications are tested by estimating the rent-vacancy adjustment 
models by Hendershott et al. (2002) and Englund et al. (2008) using data from Hong 
Kong’s office sub-markets.  However, this study differs from Hendershott et al. and 
Englund et al. in that we focus on how changes in transaction costs might affect the 
rent and vacancy adjustment process.  Empirical results suggest that rental levels in 
the Grade A office market adjust to external shocks much faster than those in the 
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Grade C office market.   Furthermore, compared with the Grade A market, vacancy 
rates in the Grade C office markets are much more responsive to external shocks.  
These results are consistent with implications of our hypotheses.  Incidentally, we 
found that Grade A office rents in Hong Kong adjusted to external shocks a lot faster 
than those reported in Englund et al., indicating relatively lower transaction costs in 
Hong Kong’s Grade A office market compared with those in the European office 
markets. 
 
This study contributes to our understanding of the role of transaction costs in shaping 
the process of rent and vacancy adjustments to external shocks by presenting a 
theoretical analysis of the adjustment process in the presence of positive transaction 
costs and undertaking empirical tests of the implications of the theoretical analyses 
The results are not only of academic significance but also have implications for 
practitioners and policy makers.  
 
 
 
 I  Introduction 
Hong Kong has established its position as a well-known international financial center.  
According to a newly released report (Yeandle et al., 2009), Hong Kong ranked No. 4 
on the list of Global Financial Centre Index 5, following London, New York and 
Singapore, despite the current financial tsunami.  The important role of the service 
sector of Hong Kong can not be emphasized more. 
 
As a premise to provide working place for different industries, especially for service 
sectors, the office, as a derived demand, is an important input.  Given the recent 
development of real estate derivatives, the office has a new role as an asset for 
investment for an increasing number of people and corporations. It is of great 
importance to understand its behavior for both users and investors.  The rental market, 
especially, is crucial because of its higher activeness than sale market. 
 
Importance of Office 
Over decades of development, Hong Kong has changed from a port to a light 
industrial center, and then to a city featured with her substantial dependence on the 
service sector.  
 
There are five categories in the services sector (Census and Statistics Department, 
2009), namely  
(1) wholesale, retail and import and export trades, restaurants and hotels 
(2) transport, storage and communications 
(3) financing, insurance, real estate and business services 
(4) community, social and personal services 
(5) ownership of premises  
 
Among the above five types, categories (3), (4) and (5) have a strong demand for 
office buildings in order to run their business.  Thus about 50% out of the entire GDP 
drivers rely on office buildings to perform.  As illustrated in Figure 1, the percentage 
contribution of industries in three categories has been increasing over the past years, 
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 and is expected to increase in the future despite the current financial crisis spreading 
around the world. 
 
Percentage Contribution to GDP at Current Factor Cost
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Figure 1: Percentage Contribution to GDP at Current Factor Cost 
 
At the same time, Hong Kong is famous for the high cost of property market.  
According to the report issued by CB Richard Ellis (2008) in November last year, 
Hong Kong’s CBD, with a reported occupancy cost of $231.59 per sq. ft., held third 
place globally and was the most expensive market in the Asia Pacific region. 
 
For existing office users in Hong Kong, high occupancy cost implies a large portion 
of the item “operational expenditure” on the financial statement due to the office rent 
payment.  More generally, high office occupancy cost may deter corporations from 
setting up a business site or acquiring additional office space in Hong Kong, which 
barricades the further development of Hong Kong’s role as the service center of 
different entities.  The decision making of choosing the office site, which incorporates 
the horizontal (address) and vertical (floor level) location, the fame of the office tower, 
the facilities and supporting equipment, and the like, is pivotal to the financial 
performance as well as the image of the entity.   
 
On the other side of the market, it is the investors who act as the suppliers, which 
generally include office developers, fund managers, etc.  Take the developer as an 
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 example, they have to understand the current performance of the office market, and 
forecast the prospects of it in order to decide whether to invest or not.  Many office 
buildings in Hong Kong are acting as a long term investing tool for the developers, so 
that they can collect rents periodically.  This long term tool provides relatively steady 
and continuous cash inflow for investors, though the break-even period for the whole 
development is quite long.  It is crucial to minimize the risk during the payback period 
to ensure the gains from the investment; therefore the projection of the inflow of rents 
is of great importance. 
 
As far as both the users and the investors are concerned, a better understanding of the 
Hong Kong office market is required, in order to assist the decision making in the cost 
of business or the investment in the property market. 
 
Transaction Cost in Office Market 
Market efficiency hypothesis (Fama, 1970) does not hold in office market in Hong 
Kong and excess returns using filter trading rules are possible in the empirical studies 
in Hong Kong (Brown and Chau, 1997).  Transaction cost exists in the office market 
with certainty.   
 
Compared with other investment markets like stock exchange and property derivative 
market, the office market has higher transaction cost.  One of the major components 
of the transaction cost is the information cost.  For office market, no two assets have 
the same characteristics, and even for the same asset, its value changes over time 
because of depreciation or possible value-added measures like refurbishments.  The 
information of the office conditions therefore becomes much more difficult to obtain.  
The transaction in office market is much less frequent than that in stock market, and 
the transaction data, because of the Land Registration Ordinance (Cap. 128, Sect. 3) 
that no registration is necessary for lease terms shorter than three years, can not be 
achieved easily. 
 
On the other hand, trading cost is also involved in the transaction cost.  Tenancy 
Agreement is subject to stamp duty (Cap. 117), while agency cost and legal fee are 
also common in a lease transaction. 
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 Objective of the Study 
Main Objective 
The study is aimed at investigating the impact of transaction cost on how rental and 
vacancy rate adjust to external shocks.  This aim is achieved by the following sub-
objectives. 
 
Sub-objectives 
The sub-objectives of the study are: 
1. Identify the types of transaction cost in rental transactions in the office market; 
2. Analyze the dynamics of rent and vacancy adjustment process in the presence 
of transaction costs and formulate testable hypotheses. 
 
With the above objectives, methods will be designed for testing the hypotheses 
developed in (2) and then the data will be collected to undertake empirical tests. 
 
Overview of Content 
The related studies with regard to rent and vacancy adjustment as well as the 
transaction cost will be examined in Chapter II.  The review will show heated 
discussions on the role of rent and vacancy in the adjustment process.  Though certain 
reasons were proposed to explain the phenomenon, there has been no empirical 
evidence to support the reasons, which appears to be a gap in this research area.  The 
transaction cost, as one of the reasons and considered to be the most important, will be 
studied in details. 
 
Chapter III presents the theoretical analysis on the impact of positive transaction cost 
on rent and vacancy adjustment.  Two hypotheses are developed after the analysis. 
 
The methodology and models used for empirical tests in Hong Kong office market are 
presented in Chapter IV, with models used in Hendershott et al. (2002) and Englund 
et al. (2008).  It will be shown that the first model, though simpler and more direct, 
- 4 - 
 omits some important factors of the office market, therefore, the second model is 
necessary. 
 
The data from the office sub-markets in Hong Kong together with the deflator and the 
employment will be shown in Chapter V. 
 
Chapter VI shows the results of the tests with two models.  Interpretation of the 
results, as well as discussions related to the empirical test, will be presented.   
 
Conclusion of the current study is drawn in Chapter VII with summary of findings, 
followed by practical implications, limitations of this study and suggestions for future 
studies. 
 
Importance of the Study 
The current study fills in the research gap in previous studies on rent and vacancy 
adjustment.  By proposing transaction cost as a major factor that affect the changes of 
rent and vacancy over time, this study offers an explanation for variations in empirical 
findings from different cities; and also provides empirical evidence that supports the 
theoretical analysis. 
 
With the acknowledgement of positive transaction cost in the office market, and its 
role on rent and vacancy adjustment, the investors and users of the offices can better 
predict the changes of important attributes of the market, and make decisions 
accordingly.  The government can also make better assessment of their policies as 
most of these policies resulted in an increase in transaction costs. 
 
From a practical point of view, understanding how transaction costs affect the rent 
and vacancy adjustment process is important in interpreting the observed changes in 
rent and vacancy levels in different sub-markets and thus can assist investors in 
making more informed decisions.  
 
Therefore, this study is important from both academic and practical points of views. 
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 II  Literature Review 
The office market is no longer a new topic after decades of real estate development.  
Some studies have been attempting to determine the cycle of the office market in 
different cities (Wheaton, 1987; Wheaton et al., 1997; Wheaton, 1999), while many 
more are focusing on the main attributes of the market, namely rental prices and 
vacancy rate.   
 
The study on rent and vacancy adjustment originated from the housing market, 
probably because of the basic human needs for shelter.  The application in office 
market is about thirty years late, but is still a heated topic nowadays. 
 
Despite ample studies on rental and vacancy adjustment in office market, almost all of 
them were conducted based on the assumption that the market is efficient, which is 
not the case in the real world.  The existence of transaction cost was acknowledged 
decades ago, but has hardly been applied, at least for this research area. 
 
In this chapter, the papers regarding to the rent and vacancy adjustment under the 
presumption of efficient market will be studied first, followed by the theory of 
transaction cost and its application in other studies. 
 
Rent and Vacancy Adjustment 
Different models have been put forward in order to study the rent and vacancy 
adjustment.  The research was first conducted in the housing market, and then in the 
office market. 
 
The relationship between rent and vacancy rate has always been a heated topic among 
the papers, as different theoretical analysis or empirical test showed various or even 
opposite arguments.  The models of adjustment will be reviewed first, followed by an 
in-depth look into the heated discussions on the response of rent and vacancy rate to 
external shocks. 
 
- 6 - 
 Models in Housing Market 
Smith (1974) was the first to provide empirical evidence on the price adjustment 
mechanism and the interrelationship between rental price and vacancy rate adjustment.  
The demand for housing service D is a function of unit rental price R, real income per 
household Y, price level P and number of households H: 
D = f (R, Y, P, H). 
The vacancy level (VL) is the excess supply: 
VL = S – f (R, Y, P, H). 
And thus the vacancy rate (V) is:  
V = VL/S = 1 - f (R, Y, P, H)/S. 
The rental adjustment mechanism is hypothesized that excess demand or supply 
determines rent variations, with inclusion of cost elements:  
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛= •−
•
−
•
11 ,,, TTVVrR , 
where  
•
R is the rate of change of rents; 
 V is the vacancy rate; and 
 
•
T is the rate of change of property tax. 
 
The model is tested with the rate of change of rental prices in five Canadian cities.  
The results of the test show that the vacancy rate significantly affected the rate of 
change of rents and thus rent levels, implying that the price of housing services was 
quite responsive to the market conditions.   
 
Later similar model was tested in Rosen and Smith (1983) with a little modification in 
the demand function: 
D = f (R, U, Y, P, Z) 
where  R is unit rental price; 
U is user cost of home-ownership; 
Y is real income per household; 
P is price level; and  
Z is demographic variables. 
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 The model was tested using data from seventeen U.S. cities, followed by a pooled 
time-series, cross-section analysis, and the relationship between rental adjustments 
and vacancy rate was reconfirmed.  The paper included an estimation of natural 
vacancy of the cities as well, though considered to range implausibly large by 
Hendershott et al. (2002). 
 
Models in Office Market 
After the discussions and tests in the housing market, similar models were then 
proposed and applied in the analysis of office markets.  The supply and demand 
approach is still applied. 
 
In Rosen (1984), the stock adjustment model was used, which encompassing the 
following equations: 
Demand:    ( )ttit PREMPOSQFT /,t = , 
where  OSQFTt is square feet of occupied office at time t 
 EMPit is employment for type i at time t, which is a function of GNP, profit of 
the corporate sector and the growth in demand for serviced industry 
 Rt/Pt is rent at time t/overall price level at time t. 
Rental adjustment:   ( )tttt PVVfR ,*−= , 
where   is change in net office rents tR
  is the actual vacancy rate tV
 is the optimal vacancy rate *tV
  is the change in overall price level. tP
Supply:    ( )TAXiCCRVfSQFT tettt ,,,,=Δ  
where  SQFTt is the totol supply of office space 
 is the expected rent levels etR
 CCt is the construction cost 
 i is the interest rates 
TAX is the tax. 
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 The model was estimated using historical data in San Francisco from 1961 to 1983.  
The optimal vacancy rate was assumed to be the average actual vacancy rate of the 
period.  The result showed that, “changes in office rents are inversely related to the 
deviation of actual vacancies from optimal vacancy rates and are directly related to 
changes in the overall cost of living”. 
 
Another approach by modeling the equilibrium price level was put forward in 
Hekman (1985) with the function of equilibrium rent: 
R= f (V, Y, E, U) 
where  V is vacancy rate; 
Y is GNP in constant dollars; 
E is total employment in the SMSA; and  
U is unemployment rate. 
 
The function of quantity supplied by investors is: 
Q = g (R (V, Y, E, i), C, I, G) 
Where Q is the quantity of space in square feet; 
C is construction cost; 
I is interest rate; and 
G is expected growth of the market.   
 
The model was tested using pooled data on fourteen central cities from 1979 to 1983. 
The result of the rent equation shows a significant response of constant-dollar rent to 
the vacancy rate. The geographical analysis in supply response, which relates closely 
to  vacancy rate, was also covered, with the view that the elasticity of supply with 
respect to demand is slightly lower for large and fast-growing cities, and the vacancy 
response for large, fast-growing and slow-growing cities showed no great difference 
(Hekman, 1985). 
 
The idea of equilibrium level of vacancy rate, or the natural vacancy, was 
incorporated in another model.  The study by Wheaton and Tort (1988) presented a 
model assuming a trending vacancy rate given a huge increase over the twenty years.  
The estimating equation was: 
R(t)/R(t-1) – 1 = a[b + ct – V(t)] 
- 9 - 
 where the natural vacancy rate was assumed to be V* = b + ct. 
 
The result showed a strong relationship between rent changes and current excess 
vacancy, and rental price adjusted roughly 2.3% per year for each percentage of 
“excess vacancy”.  In addition, it was predicted that real rents are likely to fall for the 
following six years. 
 
In a more recent study with the data for Greensboro, two models, rent level model and 
rent adjustment model, were presented (Glascock et al., 1990).  The rent level model 
is: 
( )jttjjjt SERVEMKTPHYCHARLOCfR ,,,=  
where  LOC is location; 
PHYCHAR is physical characteristics; 
MKT is overall market conditions; and 
SERVE is contracted services included in the rent.   
 
The rent adjustment model is: 
( )jtjtjt SERVEMKTgR ,=•  
where  is the percentage change in rents on each building between time periods. jtR
•
 
The models were tested using data collected by telephone survey from 1984 to 1988 
in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, suggesting that higher vacancies induce lower rent 
changes and lower vacancies allow higher rent changes.   A special feature of this 
paper was that, geographic areas and classes of buildings were considered, which 
were seldom found in other studies.  The results indicated that the relationship 
between the rent adjustment and the vacancy rate was negative and significant for all 
classes of buildings with the exception of Class D (the low-end office sub-market, 
added by the author).  The estimated coefficients (and t-statistics) for the interaction 
terms are -0.02 (-1.48), -0.04 (-2.12), and -0.02 (-1.83) for class A, B, and C buildings 
respectively (Glascock et al., 1990).  Despite the inclusion of the consideration on 
building qualities, the paper failed to go into details as to the cause behind the 
difference of coefficients and significance. 
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The replacement cost and the value of the office units were considered in Hendershott 
(1996).  The study also presented an equation of the rental adjustment where the rent 
adjusted to gaps between both the natural and actual vacancy rates (v* and v-1) and 
equilibrium and actual gross rents (g* and g-1): 
( ) ( )1*1*1/ −++−+−++ −+−=Δ jtjtjtjtjt ggvvgg βλ  
In this study, the natural vacancy rate is treated as a constant over time, while the 
equilibrium real gross rental rate was the function of the real risk-free rate plus a risk 
premium, the depreciation rate, and the expense ratio.  The actual and predicted rent 
was then plotted. 
 
The model in the study in London market by Hendershott (1999) included seven 
equations based on the supply, demand and the vacancy rate. 
Supply:    S = (1 – depreciation) S-1 + completion 
Demand:    D = D-1 + absorption 
Vacancy:    V = 100 (S – D)/S 
Real effective rent:   R* = (r + depreciation + oper) RC 
Where  r is the real interest rate; 
 oper is the operating expense ratio, assumed to be 1.5% in this study 
 RC is the product of replacement cost. 
 
The rental adjustment equation was again modeled on the gaps between natural and 
actual vacancy rate, and equilibrium and actual rent level, similar to the previous 
study (Hendershott, 1996). 
 
The paper by Hendershott et al. (2002) derived a model incorporating supply and 
demand factors within an Error Correction framework, which was based on a 
structural model of the space market using variables as rent, employment and supply.  
The greatest difference of this model from earlier papers lies in the inclusion of error 
correction term of real rent. The model was tested using the data from the City of 
London office market, showing that the ECM model had greater explanatory power 
than previous models like vacancy rate model by Hendershott (1999).  This method 
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 has advantages in that real interest rates and real estate risk premium are not required, 
and it can also run without the vacancy rate data. 
 
A recent study by Englund et al. (2008) have taken into consideration the hidden 
vacancy, which was put forward as early as 1999 (Hendershott et al.).  Hidden 
vacancy refers to the “temporary higher space usage”, which is mainly due to the 
“multi-period lease contracts, which lock tenants into rents signed in earlier periods” 
(Englund et al., 2008).  Because of the existence of hidden vacancy, “rents and 
vacancies are not simple mirror images of each other but play separate roles in the 
adjustment process” (Englund et al., 2008, p.82).   
 
Englund et al. (2008) improved the ECM model using the method of seemingly 
unrelated regression (SUR) with three equations regarding to changes in rent, vacancy 
rate, and supply, together with the employment equation estimated by ordinary least 
squares.  The impact of demand shock was then simulated to see the adjustment of 
rent, supply and vacancy.  Apart from the advantage similar to the previous study, 
namely the data for the test is easily accessible for most regions, the SUR method is 
theoretically more credible by allowing separate adjustment of rental price and 
vacancy rate. 
 
Controversy on Adjustment by Rent and Vacancy 
Both rent price and vacancy rate can be regarded as the identities of the office market 
and they are adjusting to the demand and supply of this market.  The level and 
efficiency of the adjustment of rent and vacancy rate, however, appeared to be 
different among various empirical studies mentioned above.  Theoretical analysis can 
also be found with regard to this phenomenon. 
 
The discussion of the role of rent and vacancy rate can be dated back into 1950s, 
when the housing market behavior was explained using the basic microeconomic 
theory, demand and supply, and that “every shift in demand functions should in theory 
be followed by a new adjustment of rents and number of units occupied” (Blank and 
Winnick, 1953, p.189).  Similar idea was reiterated by Maisel (1963, p.363) that, “as 
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 vacancy rate alter, the relationships between rents, prices and costs of ownership 
change also”. 
 
It was explicitly presented by Blank and Winnick (1953) that in reality, rental price 
and vacancy rate did not adjust in parallel.  Two figures, as Figure 2 and 3 shown 
below, were illustrated to show that the rental price tend to stick to the original level 
despite an increase in demand, thus the vacancy rate would fall.  Only until the 
demand increased to certain level would the landlord begin to adjust rent to a higher 
level, and vice versa.  However, the argument was only a qualitative analysis and 
“adequate data are not available for testing the hypothesis concerning the shape of 
the rent-utilization curve for multiple dwellings” (Blank and Winnick, 1953). The 
empirical material provided in the study was not convincing enough. 
 
 
Figure 2: Successive Rent Reaction under Increasing Demand (Blank and Winnick, 1953) 
 
Figure 3: Successive Rent Reaction under Declining Demand (Blank and Winnick, 1953) 
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The idea was challenged in some of the papers afterwards theoretically (Fair, 1972) 
and empirically (De Leeuw and Ekanem, 1971; Eubank and Sirmans, 1979).  In De 
Leeuw and Ekanem (1971), the simple correlation of the vacancy rate with rent levels 
was negative, and when other variables were included, the coefficient became 
insignificant.  The reasons were thought to be the measurement error, or the difference 
in “normal” vacancy rate among metropolitan areas.  The result in Eubank and 
Sirmans (1979) confirmed “the hypothesis of Blank and Winnick (1953) that different 
building types may have different rent adjustment characteristics”, but argued that 
“the primary determinant of rent adjustments in the United States appears to be 
changes in total operating expenses, while vacancy rates seem to have an 
insignificant effect upon rent adjustment”. 
 
However, the result in the study by Smith (1974) was contrary to both Blank and 
Winnick (1953) who thought the rent was sticky, and Eubank and Sirmans (1979) 
who showed the insignificant influence of vacancy rate.  In Smith’s study, the results 
showed that the vacancy rate had significant impact on the rate of change of rents, 
implying that the price of housing services was quite responsive. 
 
The argument by Blank and Winnick (1953) was re-confirmed in Clapp (1993) and 
Ball et al. (1998), where it was suggested that rental prices responded slower 
compared with vacancy rate to the changes of market conditions.  Whatever the 
demand shock was, the vacancy rate responded first, and adjusted downwards with 
demand shrinkage, or upward with demand expansion.   
 
One of the greatest contributions of the study by Clapp (1993) was the reasons 
provided in order to explain such kind of phenomenon.  The three reasons are (1) 
long-term leases, (2) high transaction and search costs, and (3) slow respond of the 
office supply (Clapp, 1993, p.33). 
 
Despite the repetitive appearance of sticker-rent-adjustment argument in different 
papers and the reasoning proposed by Clapp (1993), there have been no tests with 
empirical data concerning this argument.  The current study will fill in the research 
gap. 
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 Section Summary 
In theory, at equilibrium, the vacancy rate equals natural vacancy rate while the rent 
stays at equilibrium level.  When the vacancy rate deviates from the equilibrium, it 
means there is excess supply or demand in the market.  When the vacancy rate is 
higher, there is excess supply and the rent will be forced to decrease, therefore, more 
demand is attracted and the equilibrium will be re-established, and vice versa. 
 
It can be found that previous studies were generally derived from the basic supply and 
demand model of the office market and with some variables in common, though some 
took the stock as given (Smith, 1974; Rosen and Smith, 1983; Wheaton and Torto, 
1988; Glascock et al., 1990; Hendershott, 1996), and some incorporated the change of 
stock (Rosen, 1984; Hekman, 1985; Hendershott et al., 1999; Hendershott et al., 2002; 
Englund et al., 2008). 
 
For the studies which require the level of natural vacancy rate and equilibrium rent 
level, the data is not available and many assumptions are required, thus lowering the 
reliability of the empirical tests.  In light of this, among all the models presented here, 
the ECM model by Hendershott et al. (2002) is considered to be most useful due to 
the accessibility of data.    The ECM model is improved in the study in 2008 (Englund 
et al.) by employing the method of SUR which allows separate adjustment of rent and 
vacancy, making the test more convincing.  The current study therefore is mainly 
based on these two models.  
 
The adjustment of rental price and vacancy rate appeared to be different among the 
previous studies, but have not been studied in-depth.  In light of the reasons proposed 
by Clapp (1993), the transaction and search cost is to be studied, while the other two 
reasons are not considered in this study. 
 
Transaction Cost, Information Asymmetry and Search Cost 
There have been different opinions on the elements of transaction cost.  The 
information asymmetry and search cost will be the focus for this study because of 
their close relevance in the office market.  
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 Theoretical Analysis of Transaction Cost 
An important concept that is implicitly related to the rental market is transaction cost, 
a basic economic concept gaining more attention in new institutional economics.  The 
transaction costs obviously exist in the office market, though most of the authors 
tended to ignore this factor and conducted studies based on the assumption of efficient 
market. 
 
Early studies on transaction cost mainly originated from the discussion on the firms 
and contracts (Coase, 1937), where it was argued that the transaction cost in the 
contracting structure was crucial for determining the size of the firm. 
 
The argument on the contractual nature of firms was followed by Alchian and 
Demsetz (1975) and Cheung (1983).  In Cheung (1983), the author offered four 
general reasons why the discovery and negotiation of prices are more costly in the 
absence of firm, on the basis of the works by Coase.  First is the number of 
transactions required, second is the information cost of knowing a product, third is the 
measurement of characteristics or attributes of the product, and fourth is the problem 
of separating contributions. 
 
The transaction cost was also studied in the construction industry by Chau and Walker 
(1994) in order to investigate the nature of subcontracting.  It is another application in 
the spectrum of contracting. 
 
For the case of this study, it would be more important to study transaction cost on a 
more general occasion.  In Dahlman (1979), the categorization of transaction cost was 
studied in terms of the stages in the process of transaction:   
1. At the very beginning, the two parties need to search for each other to conduct 
an exchange, which takes time and resources; 
2. When the search stage is completed and the two parties find each other, they 
have to inform the other of the exchange opportunities, which also takes time 
and resources.  The decision making process is also costly, especially when 
there are several agents for either side of the parties, and is always ended after 
a long time on bargaining; 
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 3. After the trade is made, it takes time and resources for one party to police and 
monitor the other party so as to make sure that the other party fulfils all the 
obligations listed in the contract, and to enforce certain provisions agreed upon. 
Therefore, three kinds of transaction costs are illustrated here, namely “search and 
information costs, bargaining and decision costs, policing and enforcement costs”. 
 
Despite that three kinds of cost are mentioned, it was suggested that the three types 
fundamentally originate from lack of information, which then causes resources losses. 
 
Apart from the argument on origination of transaction cost, according to Williamson 
(1979), the amount of transaction cost is closely related to the uncertainty of 
transaction, the frequency with which transactions recur, and the degree to which 
durable transaction-specific investments are incurred. 
 
The uncertainty of transaction was then studied in detail in the context of contract 
again.  The contract arrangement was mentioned during the review of the concept of 
transaction cost by Pollak (1985). It was said that: 
Short-term contracting is hazardous because, even when contract renewal is 
mutually beneficial, one party or the other may have advantages that can be 
exploited in bilateral negotiations over renewal terms.  The problems of contract 
renewal can be avoided or at least postponed by long-term con-tracts, but only if 
such contracts are "complete" in the sense that they specify the obligations of the 
parties under every possible contingency. Complete long-term contracts are costly 
or impossible to write and enforce, however, a reflection of bounded rationality 
and asymmetric in-formation; and incomplete long-term con-tracts which fail to 
deal with every contingency expose the parties to the hazards of bilateral 
bargaining. To avoid these contracting hazards firms often rely on some more 
complete form of integration such as merger. Thus, contracting difficulties – the 
problems of negotiating, writing, monitoring, and enforcing agreements – are 
central instances of transaction costs, and transaction cost economics asserts that 
they are significant determinants of the organization of production. 
Given the uncertainties in the contracting period, it is difficult to determine which 
kind of contract incurs the lowest transaction cost. 
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 Tenancy Agreement during office rental transactions can be considered as a contract.  
Provided that the lease terms for office market in the same city among different sub-
markets are generally similar, the impact of term length is not the focus of this paper; 
rather, the contracting difficulties require attention. 
 
Transaction Cost in Property Market 
The concept of transaction cost has also been applied in the real estate industry.  The 
effects of moving transaction costs on the potential effect of government rent subsidy 
programs was studied in Venti and Wise (1985).  It was suggested that transaction 
costs appeared in monetary terms and especially in non-monetary terms as well, “like 
lost of friendship and change of schools”. 
 
The study by Brown and Chau (1997) has shown that under the assumption of 2% and 
6% trading cost for selling and buying respectively, significant positive excess returns 
can still be earned in the office market of Hong Kong by filter rules which provide 
buying and selling signals, indicating that “the office sub-market in Hong Kong may 
be inefficient”.  The study is based on trade market rather than leasing market, but can 
still cast light on the implication of the transaction costs which cause market failure. 
 
The study by Englund et al. (2008) is probably the only one that investigates the 
effect of transaction cost in office market.  However, the transaction cost discussed in 
this study was equivalent to the effect of long-term leases, which is actually only a 
small portion in the transaction cost, or even smaller, for cities where the lease terms 
are usually short, like the case in Hong Kong where lease terms generally last for two 
or three years.  The information asymmetry and search cost, compared with the effect 
of lease terms, are more universally applicable in the office markets around the world, 
and should require greater attention. 
 
Information Asymmetry  
A study by Chau et al. (2002) challenged the prediction of low-quality good driving 
high-quality good out of market (Akerlof, 1970), and explain why the lemon effect 
did not exist in the second-hand real estate market.  It was argued that:  
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 For real estate, the quality of real estate is usually related to the proportion of 
land value, i.e. higher quality real estate is built on more expansive land 
(analogous to transportation costs). Since the land attributes of real estates are 
usually symmetric (easily observable by buyer and sellers), high-quality real 
estate could also mean higher proportion of values attributable to symmetric 
attributes, which compensate the effects due to asymmetric attributes. 
… 
In the real estate market, the value of real estate attributable to land (location, 
accessibility and other environmental attributes) is likely to be more symmetrical 
to the value attributable to the structure (which may contain latent defects). 
As the land value is a residual value derived from the gross development value 
deducted by cost and expenses, high land value indicates high value of the premises 
on the land.  As land value can be observed by the general public, there is no 
information asymmetry.  However, as the argument implies, the value of an office 
building includes not only the land value, but also the structure.  The value of the 
structure can not be easily determined without time and professionals. 
 
There are plenty of studies on asymmetric information. However, almost all of the 
studies are conducted within the boundary of financial market (Miller and Rock, 1985; 
De Meza and Webb, 1987; Sharpe, 1990).  The study of asymmetric information in 
real estate market was observed only in the context of housing market (Read, 1988; 
Arnott, 1989), but few people have studied the existence and implications of 
asymmetric information in the office market. 
 
Search Cost 
With regard to search cost specifically, it is suggested by Wheaton (1990) in a study 
of housing market that the vacancy rate, which is stable in the short run, determines 
the expected length of search.  It was argued that: 
In the short run, the number of units and households is assumed fixed.  
Households periodically "change" and therefore seek to move from an existing 
house that no longer suits their needs.  The prospect of remaining in such a 
"mismatched" state determines both the search "effort" and the offer price made 
by buyers.  Sellers are merely buyers who have found a new unit and are seeking 
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 to dispose of their old one.  Their reservations are determined by expectations 
about sales time and the costs of holding two units. 
 
It was also mentioned that greater vacancy will increase sales time, lower seller 
reservations, speed up search time, and lead to lower market prices.  Search is 
necessary because there is imperfect information, possibly about which units are for 
sale and certainly about a unit's type (Wheaton, 1990).  However, Clapp (1993) 
critiqued on such search model and argued that “the search theory model does not 
appear to tell the entire story about office market adjustments”, and that “the 
adjustment of rental rates should be influenced by both the natural vacancy rate and 
the optimal level of rents”. 
 
Apart from the vacancy rate, the rent level was suggested to be affected by the search 
cost in relation with the behavior of property manager by Benjamin and Lusht (1993).  
The proxies for the level of search costs were found to be positively and significantly 
related to the rent level in this study. 
 
Other studies on search cost in the area of real estate can be found related to real 
estate participants like brokers (Yinger, 1981; Yavas, 1992). 
 
With the advance of new technology, the search cost was studied in the context of 
electronic market place (Bakos, 1997).  This article focused mainly on the effect of 
reducing searching costs in electronic marketplaces and the implementation.  It was 
suggested that, if the cost of search is low enough, buyers look at all product offerings 
and purchase the one best serving their needs, resulting in a socially optimal 
allocation. 
 
A recent article studied on the effect of search cost on price and price dispersion 
(Pereira, 2005).  This paper presented a search model, for which a decrease in the 
search cost may lead to lower prices and to a lower price variance, but may also lead 
to the opposite.  Such conclusion is ambiguous in nature. 
 
The research on the impact of search cost is already limited, while most of the 
previous studies remain on the theoretical level or in areas other than the real estate 
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 market.  The impact of search cost on the dynamics of office market is yet to be 
studied theoretically and empirically. 
 
Section Summary 
Probably due to the difficulty of quantification of transaction cost, especially the 
substantial non-pecuniary portion, this subject, though put forward decades ago, has 
been touched upon to a small extent.  Most of the studies still carry on with the 
assumption of efficient market, however far away from the real life. 
 
The effect of lease terms and moving cost does not seem to be strong in every city in 
the world.  The trading cost, on the other hand, is easily determined and occupies only 
a small portion of the transaction cost.  Therefore, the transaction cost depends greatly 
on non-pecuniary cost, and mainly the information asymmetry and search cost. 
 
Chapter Summary 
A number of models have been developed to determine the adjustment of rental prices 
and vacancy rate, and empirical studies in difference cities have been carried out. 
 
The models are all based on the fundamentals of demand and supply of office rental 
market.  While some models require the determination of equilibrium rental and 
vacancy level to plot the adjustment process, the models in Hendershott et al.  (2002) 
and Englund et al. (2008) do not, and the variables in the models are easily accessible.  
Therefore, these two models are considered to be more useful. 
 
The theoretical analyses and empirical evidences have shown different adjustment of 
rental price and vacancy rate in different studies.   Clapp (1993) and Ball et al. (1998) 
argued that the rental price adjust less swiftly compared with vacancy rate to the 
demand shock. In addition, Clapp (1993) provided three possible reasons including 
long-term lease, transaction cost and slow respond of supply.  However, tests with 
empirical data on this argument remain blank. 
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 Despite the models and arguments on the rental and vacancy adjustment, the 
transaction cost, especially information asymmetry and search cost, has seldom been 
related to the performance of office market.  In the current study, the effect of 
transaction cost will be studied in the context of office market, using the model in 
Hendershott et al.  (2002) and Englund et al. (2008).  By taking into consideration of 
the difference in transaction cost among various sub-markets, the difference of rental 
and vacancy rate adjustment will be presented in this paper.  Theoretical analysis will 
be conducted first. 
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 III  Theoretical Analysis 
Most of the previous studies considered office market as a whole.  However, Dowall 
(1988) pointed out that office markets are becoming more complex as user activities 
become more specialized.  Office users can no longer be regarded as a monolithic 
group, and each type of users has different preferences for office locations.  The 
examples of the types of office users are headquarters, back-office, governmental and 
institutional users, professional and business services etc. in Dowall (1988).  The 
segmentation idea was employed by Glascock et al. (1990), however, the study 
remained only on rent level which is considered at a point of time, rather than over a 
series of time during which the performance changes, neither has it investigated the 
fundamental reasons behind difference between offices of different qualities.  The 
study on office quality related to market dynamics remains untouched by previous 
researches. 
 
The segmentation idea is appreciated and adopted in the current study.  Generally 
speaking, the office market can be divided according to users, with high-end and low-
end at two extremes, and the others lying along in the middle.  High-end offices set 
high income generating users as their target tenants and charge higher rental price, 
while low-end offices target users with low incomes, and the office space is less 
expensive.   
 
The major difference between high-end and low-end office sub-markets will be 
studied first, with the implications on the variance in transaction cost.  Two 
hypotheses will be proposed based on the theoretical analysis. 
 
Differences between Low-end and High-end Offices 
These two sub-markets have many differences, mainly in rent, owner and tenants, thus 
causing different transaction costs and behaviors. 
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 Rent 
Given similar location (land value), floor level, building age and the like, the rental 
price for high-end office building is generally higher than low-end ones, mainly 
because of the facilities and management provided by the high-end office buildings, 
and the reputation and image of the building.  The difference of the rental level 
between different sub-markets is obvious, despite certain overlap of the rental price 
spectrum. 
 
The trading cost is usually determined by the rental value, since the agency cost, the 
stamp duty and legal charges are usually set as a percentage of the rental price. 
 
The rental level is more important when taking the transaction cost into account.  
Even if the transaction cost for an office unit is same for all sub-markets, lower rental 
level implies higher proportion of transaction cost. 
 
Owner 
The type of owners varies among office sub-markets.  For high-end offices, one office 
building is usually owned by a single owner.  In contrast, multi-ownership is common 
in low-end office market.   
 
From the point of the tenants, the type of ownership implies the efficiency in finding 
potential office spaces.  For high-end office owners, they usually employ a noted 
leasing agent and take care of the leasing matters of the whole office building they 
own.  The leasing agent serves as a platform for tenants and owners to negotiate with 
each other and close deals, which makes the transaction process more efficient.  It 
may not be the case for low-end office buildings owners due to the high cost in 
employing well-known leasing agent when the transaction only involves a few units.  
Individual owners in the low-end office building still approach leasing agency.  But 
they are reluctant to find famous ones, thus making it more difficult for tenants to 
know the information. 
 
On the other hand, for office buildings with single owner, they will try to optimize the 
vacancy level and rental level of the units in the office building throughout the time, 
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 since the owner has access to the provisions on each Tenancy Agreement, thus being 
able to adjust the price and vacancy rate from time to time to reach the optimal level.  
Multiple owners of an office building are not able to optimize the provisions, since 
their access to the lease terms of other owners in the same building incurs substantial 
information costs. Therefore, they will save those costs by adjusting the provisions 
during the negotiation with the tenants. 
 
Tenants 
In terms of tenants, the demand for high-end offices mainly comes from the finance 
industry, like banking, hedge fund, etc.   This industry makes large profit, at least 
before the current financial tsunami; therefore the high rental price is affordable.  At 
the same time, this group of tenants has many requirements on the office facilities, 
like the effectiveness and efficiency of air-conditioning, the internet connection speed, 
the electricity backup during contingencies, etc.  Furthermore, the prestige of the 
office building, implied by the location, is also of great importance on the image of 
the company.  Thus, high-end office is their only choice. 
 
The tenants in low-end offices, however, come from all walks of life.  The tenants fall 
in the industry of manufacturing, finance and business services, and community, 
social and personal services, based on empirical evidences.  Low-end offices have the 
poorest conditions among all the office buildings, with average facilities and limited 
property management.  In addition, they are a close substitute of industrial buildings, 
as some tenants are from the manufacturing industry.  The entities in low-end offices 
are featured by small and medium size of business.  The low rent price of this 
category is favored by small and medium-sized enterprises in consideration of the 
balance between income and expenses. 
 
For other offices lying between the two extremes, tenants are generally in the 
industries like insurance, real estate, business services, medical, dental and other 
health and veterinary services 1 , which are not as profitable as the business like 
                                                 
1 The taxonomy of industry is based on Hong Kong Annual Digest issued annually by Census and 
Statistics Department of Hong Kong government. 
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 banking and finance.  Prestige of office building is of less importance for these tenants, 
and they are less demanding on the facilities of the office as well.  The main value of 
the office is to offer an amiable environment for the tenants to carry out business.  
 
As far as the owners are concerned, the degree of complication of tenants has the 
implication of finding potential tenants.  Obviously, for the owners of a high-end 
office building, it is much easier to find the potential tenants since they can just find 
those enterprises in the finance industry.  For the owners of a low-end office building, 
the job is much more difficult as the tenants come from different industries and are 
difficult to reach. 
 
Unit Size 
The size of the office units in rental transaction also varies among different sub-
markets.  As large companies are the main demand driver for high-end offices, they 
usually need more space to carry out their businesses, and at the same time, they can 
afford large space.  Therefore, each rental transaction of high-end offices often 
involves large office unit. 
 
The low-end offices, however, are rented by small and medium enterprises as 
mentioned above, thus they do not demand a working area as large as that of the large 
companies, and generally are not able to afford large office units.  The average size of 
rented low-end offices should be much smaller. 
 
Section Summary 
When the office market is studied using the approach of segmentation, it can be 
observed that different office sub-markets have different characteristics.  High-end 
offices usually have higher rent level with larger unit size, single ownership, and 
tenants in the same industry with high profit, while the characteristics of low-end 
offices seem to be on the contrary. 
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 Transaction cost 
The above differences among office sub-markets have implications on the difference 
of transaction costs among them.  
 
It is difficult to quantify the transaction cost, in that it can be pecuniary or non-
pecuniary for both tenants and owners. Pecuniary cost includes the costs that lead to 
the accomplishment of trade like advertisement charges, the transportation fares and 
telephone fees, and trading costs like agency fee, legal charges, and stamp duty.  For 
non-pecuniary costs, it is most likely to be the time taken in finding potential tenants 
or appropriate office units. 
 
Resource losses incurred due to imperfect information may be the only one 
transaction cost according to Dahlman (1979).  Still, it would be clearer to study the 
cost by classes.   
 
Search and Information Cost 
The search and information cost is different for the participants of the market, and 
also for different sub-markets. 
 
As far as the owner is concerned, the search cost covers the money and time for them 
to find the right tenant.  The word “right” may have different interpretations for 
different owners, but there are some common basic requirements.  The possibility of 
default of the tenants is always considered by the owners.  Potential tenants in high-
end offices generally have well-established business with high possibility of 
continuity, while tenants in low-end offices usually own small and medium businesses, 
thus bearing a higher default risk.  The owner has to study the performance of the 
tenants and value the possibility of default before renting out the unit.  In addition, the 
quality of the tenant may also be judged by observing how they use and preserve the 
existing office space.  Depreciation of building is not avoidable, but with more careful 
use of the space, it can be slowed down.  
 
The tenant is also searching the market for both the property and the owner.  
Information asymmetry exists between the owner and the tenants.  The situation is not 
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 very serious for high-end offices, since on one hand, many high-end offices are built 
by noted developers, and the quality is reasonably trustable, and on the other hand, the 
market analysis is abundant for high-end offices, making the tenant well-informed.  In 
addition, high-end offices can be usually found on land with high values, which is 
considered to be symmetric information to both the owner and the tenants (Chau et al., 
2002).   
 
The asymmetry is more obvious for low-end office markets, since there is almost no 
market analysis for these two sub-markets, and the land value, the symmetric 
information, takes up a lower portion of the value, while the structure value, the 
asymmetric one, takes up higher portion (Chau et al., 2002).  The quality of the office 
building requires the on-site observation of the tenants themselves, but the owner may 
still keep silent of some information that the tenant has not raised but should be aware 
of. 
 
Bargaining and Decision Making Cost 
In bargaining and decision making process, the cost occurs when there is information 
asymmetry as to the “willingness to trade on certain conditions”, and when resources 
are spent in “determining whether the terms of the trade are mutually agreeable” 
(Dahlman, 1979).   
 
From the owner’s point of view, the more famous the tenant is, the more the 
information is available.  As tenants of high-end offices are usually large enterprises, 
which usually have their company listed thus publishing performance periodically, 
while tenants of low-end offices are mainly from small and medium enterprises, 
which are usually not listed and are not required to publish their business 
performances.  It can be reasonably inferred that the high-end office owner knows 
more about the tenants so as to determine their willingness, while owners of low-end 
offices know less. 
 
On the other hand, as the high-end office building is usually owned by single owner, 
they have access to the settled price in other units of the same building, thus making it 
easier to set an initial price and negotiate with potential tenants.  The multiple owners 
- 28 - 
 in low-end office buildings, however, do not have sufficient information to optimize 
the initial price on which further negotiation is based. 
 
As far as the tenants are concerned, there is more information available for high-end 
offices than for low-end offices in the market, because of the reasons mentioned in the 
previous section.  Therefore, it is easier for high-end office tenants to know the 
“willingness” of the owner by gathering information in the market. 
 
The decision making cost is depended on the information known by the parties and 
their negotiations skills.  Provided that the negotiation skills are identical among the 
parties in different office units, the decision making cost should be higher in low-end 
offices for less information available. 
 
Policing and Enforcement Cost 
This kind of cost is incurred “because there is lack of knowledge as to whether one 
(or both) of the parties involved in the agreement will violate his part of the bargain” 
(Dahlman, 1979).  As mentioned before, the tenants in low-end offices have higher 
possibilities of default because of the nature and profitability of their business, 
therefore the rental payment is less assured, but the owner is not able to determine.  
This contributes to a higher policing and enforcement cost for low-end offices.   
 
As tenants in high-end offices are usually large enterprises, the default risk is 
relatively low, thus such cost is lower for high-end offices. 
 
Section Summary 
Given the above analysis, among the three office sub-markets, the transaction cost 
related to high-end offices is supposed to be the lowest given the relatively stable 
source of demand, sufficient supply, as well as abundant information in the market.  
The transaction cost of low-end offices, in contrast, is the greatest because of the 
diversity of industries concerned, the scale of the business, the limited supply, and 
inadequate information in the market.  The transaction cost of other offices lies 
between the two ends. 
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Considering that high-end offices have higher rental price and larger unit size, while 
low-end offices are on the other extreme, it is reasonable to reach the conclusion that 
the transaction cost per unit rental space of low-end offices is higher than high-end 
offices.  The level of transaction cost for other offices should lie between the two 
extremes. 
 
Impact of Transaction Cost on Rent and Vacancy Adjustment 
Because of the transaction cost in finding, contracting and enforcing proper office 
units, which vary between different office sub-markets, it is expected that the 
transaction cost affects the rental and vacancy adjustment to different degrees for 
different sub-markets. 
 
The model of the impact of transaction cost on rental and vacancy adjustment is built 
based on the supply and demand model.  For simplicity, the natural vacancy is 
assumed to be 0%, and the equilibrium price is the equilibrium with no transaction 
cost, like the case in Figure 4: 
 
PL 
PH 
E: E with no transaction cost 
EL: E with low transaction cost 
EH: E with high transaction cost 
P 
D S 
VL 
VH’ 
VH 
VL’ 
 
Figure 4: Market Equilibrium with Transaction Cost when Demand Declines 
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With no transaction cost, the market will reach equilibrium E with rental price P and 
quantity agreed by both sides and there is no excess supply or demand.   
 
However, in a market with positive transaction cost, the cost is being added to the 
original equilibrium price, causing excess supply, and thus there will be a vacancy 
rate.  For offices with same rental price at market equilibrium under no transaction 
cost, the rental price and vacancy rate will be different under different amount of 
transaction cost.   
 
With low transaction cost, equilibrium rent at EL is: 
PL > P, 
and vacancy level: 
Vacancy = SL – DL = VL. 
 
With high transaction cost, equilibrium rent at EH is: 
PH > P, 
and vacancy level: 
Vacancy = SH – DH = VH. 
 
As shown in Figure 4, the equilibrium rent and vacancy under higher transaction cost 
is higher than with lower transaction cost, i.e.: 
PH > PL; VH > VL. 
 
When there is external shock, say, the decline in demand for office space due to 
global recession, the market behaves differently under different transaction costs.  
Assuming that the rental prices remain unchanged for the short run, the vacancy rate 
needs to change to a new level so as to adjust to the new market equilibrium, like VH’ 
for high transaction cost and VL’ for low transaction cost in the figure.  The absolute 
amount of change in vacancy is the same as shown in the figure, i.e.: 
VL’ – VL = VH’ – VH 
 
However rent will not remain unchanged after external shock but would adjust, at 
least partially, to a new level.  When transaction cost is high, such adjustment is small 
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 (close to the original level) leaving a larger change in vacancy level.  On the other 
hand, when transaction cost is low, rental adjustment is faster and deeper (further 
away from the original rent) leaving a smaller change in vacancy level.  That is, under 
partial rental adjustment: 
(VL’ – VL ) < (VH’ – VH ) 
 
Therefore, when there is a decline in demand, vacancy rate will change more when 
transaction costs are high.  
 
When, in contrast, there is a sudden increase in demand like the case in Figure 5, the 
absolute amount of change in vacancy is also same for any transaction cost, i.e. 
VL’ – VL = VH’ – VH 
before excess demand is observed, under the assumption that the rental prices remain 
unchanged.  In reality, the rent will adjust accordingly, similar to the situation under 
the decline in demand. 
 
The above analysis also applies when the supply is changed. 
 
S 
PL 
PH 
E: E with no transaction cost 
EL: E with low transaction cost 
EH: E with high transaction cost 
P 
VL 
D 
VL’ = 0% 
VH’ 
VH 
 
Figure 5: Market Equilibrium with Transaction Cost when Demand Increases 
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 From the above analysis, we can conclude that when transaction cost is low, rent will 
play a more important role than vacancy rate in response to external shocks while the 
opposite is true when transaction cost is high.   In the extreme case of zero transaction 
cost, rent will adjust to the new equilibrium rent instantaneously upon external shock 
and vacancy rate is always equal to the natural vacancy rate.  On the other extreme, 
when transaction costs are high enough to prohibit any change in rent, vacancy rate 
will fluctuate significantly around the natural vacancy when there are external shocks. 
 
Development of Hypothesis 
As mentioned above, the major type of transaction costs that matters in the office 
rental market are due to information asymmetry and search cost.  Such costs can not 
be easily measured on a cardinal scale but can be easily ranked for office of different 
quality.  For low-end offices, transaction costs are higher, while transaction costs are 
lower for high-end offices.   
 
The information asymmetry is evidenced in two aspects.  First, low-end office tenant 
are usually small companies. The default risk of these companies is higher compared 
with tenants of high-end offices.  There is information asymmetry about the quality of 
tenants. Second, a relatively larger proportion of the rental values of low-end offices 
are determined by the attributes of the building structure since the “land value” 
component of these offices is lower.  The “land value” of component of office rent 
mainly is derived from the location attributes of the office building, which can be 
easily assessed by both tenants and landlord and thus less information asymmetry 
problem (Chau et al., 2002).  However, the landlord usually has more information on 
the quality of the building structure then the tenant.   This leads to information 
asymmetry about the quality for the office building.   
 
Because of a more heterogeneous group of potential tenants than that of high-end 
offices, the cost of searching for the right tenants per office unit is higher for low-end 
office.  Furthermore, even if such search cost per office unit is the same in absolute 
terms, transaction cost, as percentage of rental value is still higher for low-end offices 
due to lower rent per floor areas. 
 
- 33 - 
 Therefore, given the theoretical analysis above and the ranking of transaction costs in 
the office rental market, we hypothesize that: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Compared with low-end offices, rental levels of high-end offices are 
more responsive to external shocks, ceteris paribus. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Compared with low-end offices, vacancy rates of high-end offices are 
less responsive to external shocks, ceteris paribus. 
 
Chapter Summary 
The different features of high-end and low-end offices imply various proportions of 
transaction cost relative to rental value.  The transaction costs in the office market 
mainly arise from information asymmetry and search cost.  High-end offices incur 
lower transaction costs, compared with low-end ones. 
 
Based on the theoretical analysis of the impact of transaction cost on rent and vacancy 
adjustment, it is hypothesized that, rental levels of high-end offices are more 
responsive to external shocks, while their vacancy rates are less responsive, compared 
with low-end ones which encompassing higher transaction costs. 
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 IV  Empirical Tests 
The tests of the two hypotheses will be undertaken in the Hong Kong office sub-
markets, namely Grade A, B and C offices. 
 
As discussed in Literature Review, the model based on the Error Correction Model 
(Hendershott et al., 2002) is useful to test the rental adjustment.  Considering some 
drawbacks of this model, a second model, used in Englund et al. (2008) is applied 
here, which uses the method of seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR). As both of the 
models can be applied in the Hong Kong office market and sub-markets, there is no 
new model proposed in this paper. 
 
Research Subjects 
In order to test the impact of transaction cost on the rental adjustment, at least two 
markets should be studied, namely one high-end market and one low-end market.  The 
attributes of the two (or more) markets being tested other than their transaction cost 
should be as identical as possible, so the result of the test can be more convincing.  In 
order to control the differences between the markets under study, it would be better if 
the two (or more) markets are actually the sub-markets of one region; therefore, the 
political and cultural issues are of little concern. 
 
Given the data available in Hong Kong, it would be possible to use classified office 
sub-markets to test the models, and see whether the hypotheses hold or not.  Such 
method actually helps a better understanding of the office market (Dowall, 1988). 
 
The office market in Hong Kong can be divided into three sub-markets, according to 
the grading scheme provided by Rating and Valuation Department (2008): 
Grade A - modern with high quality finishes; flexible layout; large floor plates; 
spacious, well decorated lobbies and circulation areas; effective central air-
conditioning; good lift services zoned for passengers and goods deliveries; 
professional management; parking facilities normally available. 
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 Grade B - ordinary design with good quality finishes; flexible layout; average-
sized floor plates; adequate lobbies; central or free-standing air-conditioning; 
adequate lift services, good management; parking facilities not essential. 
 
Grade C - plain with basic finishes; less flexible layout; small floor plates; basic 
lobbies; generally without central air-conditioning; barely adequate or 
inadequate lift services; minimal to average management; no parking facilities. 
 
It should be noted that location is not a feature of grade. Offices owned by the 
Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and managed by the 
Government Property Agency are excluded. 
 
Grade A offices in Hong Kong can be regarded as high-end offices, while Grade C 
offices as low-end offices.  The Grade B office performance should lie between the 
two extreme cases. 
 
Table 1 shows the average rental price (average rent per square meter of saleable floor 
areas per month) over the observation period, 1981-2007.   The unit rent for Grade A 
office is approximately 1.4 times that of Grade B offices and 1.75 times that of Grade 
C offices.  
 
Year Grade A Grade B Grade C 
1981 207 157 118 
1982 204 153 120 
1983 165 110 93 
1984 131 95 80 
1985 134 94 79 
1986 159 114 89 
1987 208 143 105 
1988 292 218 156 
1989 468 330 233 
1990 485 345 251 
1991 431 332 257 
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 1992 423 348 286 
1993 487 387 319 
1994 600 454 363 
1995 592 450 364 
1996 514 377 321 
1997 535 388 325 
1998 466 325 271 
1999 310 232 213 
2000 319 220 202 
2001 354 229 203 
2002 267 191 180 
2003 219 174 161 
2004 229 180 167 
2005 316 214 192 
2006 404 259 216 
2007 508 302 246 
Average 349 253 208 
Table 1: Averge Rents by Grade in Core Districts2 (in $/sq.m. per month)3 
 
The above average rent data is also plotted in Figure 6.  The average rent of Grade A 
is higher than that of Grade B, and that of Grade B is higher than of Grade C 
throughout out the whole observation period.  The dot-dash lines show average rents 
of each office sub-markets for the period.  
                                                 
2 List of core districts:  
(1) Sheung Wan,  
(2) Central,  
(3) Wan Chai / Causeway Bay,  
(4) North Point / Quarry Bay (starting from 1999), 
(5) Tsim Sha Tsui,  
(6) Yau Ma Tei / Mong Kok. 
3 Source: Hong Kong Property Review, 1981 ~ 2008, published by Rating and Valuation Department,  
HKSAR 
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Figure 6: Average Rents by Grade in Core Districts 
 
The average unit size for the rental market in Hong Kong is also consistent with the 
theoretical analysis, in that the size for Grade A offices is the largest, while that of the 
Grade C offices is the smallest.  The table below gives empirical evidence: 
 
Year Grade A Grade B Grade C 
1983 118 56 40 
1984 159 62 42 
1985 176 61 49 
1986 214 59 41 
1987 195 62 41 
1988 171 68 46 
1989 186 71 48 
1990 190 71 45 
1991 169 71 44 
1992 184 77 45 
1993 212 81 44 
1994 210 79 43 
1995 194 76 42 
1996 210 76 42 
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 1997 240 83 42 
1998 249 78 42 
1999 222 76 41 
2000 247 81 43 
2001 216 85 41 
2002 229 83 45 
2003 248 91 44 
2004 252 80 46 
2005 266 85 44 
2006 274 92 46 
2007 252 83 45 
Average 211 75 44 
Table 2: Average Size  of Rented Office Units by Grade (in m2 of floor area)4 
 
On average, the size of Grade A office in the rental market is about three times that of 
Grade B and five times that of Grade C.  The level is consistent for the past years as 
shown in the figure below: 
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Figure 7: Trends of Average Size  of Rented Office Units (1983-2007) 
 
                                                 
4 Source: Hong Kong Property Review, 1984 ~ 2008, published by Rating and Valuation Department,  
HKSAR; data available only from 1983. 
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 The data set of each sub-market in Hong Kong office market will be used to test the 
models.  It is expected that the Grade A office (high-end office) should show 
significant rental adjustment, and Grade C office (low-end office) should show 
significant vacancy adjustment.  The test with data of Grade B office works as a check 
for consistency between one extreme and the other. 
 
By choosing the sub-markets of the same city, certain variables can be controlled.  
Among the three reasons proposed in Clapp (1993) for the slower adjustment of rental 
prices, namely transaction cost, long-term lease, and the slow supply of office space, 
only transaction cost is considered to be the main reason in this study, while the other 
two are not considered to be of similar importance since they are not significantly 
different among the three sub-markets. 
 
The office lease usually has duration of two or three years at fixed rate in Hong Kong 
(Landscope Real Estate Services Ltd., 2009) because of the exemption of registration 
for lease term under three years (Cap. 128).    For other cities in the world, say, 
London, office lease lengths amount to 10.8 years for year 2007/08 on a rent weighted 
basis, according to British Property Federation and Investment Property Databank 
(2008). The office lease duration in Hong Kong is apparently much shorter, compared 
with other cities in the world. 
 
For the typical two-year lease terms in Hong Kong, it is a common practice to restrict 
the first year of tenancy but allow flexibility of the second year.  Similar to the 
situation in foreign countries, an “exit option” is usually available in the leasing files.  
Tenants in Hong Kong can usually have one month notice of leave after one year of 
tenancy, which is shorter than the practices abroad.  The time of execution of exit 
option has larger variation in foreign countries. 
 
In terms of the supply side, the development of new office building has to go through 
prescribed procedures, and fulfils the requirements under Outline Zoning Plan, land 
lease, and Buildings Ordinance.  The construction of an office project normally takes 
two to three years, but the time taken for statutory procedure before and after the 
construction stage varies widely from case to case. 
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 Models 
The Error Correction Model (Hendershott et al., 2002) will be tested first because of 
its simplicity and high applicability with the data available.  
 
However, considering the defects of this model as not considering the hidden vacancy, 
the model using seemingly unrelated regression method (Englund et al., 2008) will 
then be tested using the same set of data. 
 
Error Correction Model (Hendershott et al., 2002) 
This model is derived from the fundamentals of economics – the concept of demand 
and supply. 
 
The demand for space can be presented into the following function: 
21
0
λλλ ERD =           (1) 
where R is real effective rent, E is the employment, iλ  are constants (the “price” 
elasticity being negative and the “income” elasticity being positive).   
 
The market clearing rent for a given level of vacancy rate is given by: 
( ) ( )SvERD −== 1,         (2) 
where S is supply and v is the vacancy rate.   
 
Substituting Equation (1) into (2) and solving for R gives: 
( )[ 21 10 γγγ SvER −= ]         (3) 
 
Taking logs of both sides of the above equation gives: 
SvER ln)1ln(lnlnln 2210 γγγγ +−++=      (4) 
 
The coefficients on the vacancy rate and supply variables should be the same.  The 
underlying elasticities can be obtained from these estimates as price 
elasticity 21 /1 γλ = , and income elasticity 212 /- γγλ = . 
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 The residual in the estimation of Equation (4) is the difference between the actual and 
estimated values in the long-run. 
( )[ ]ttttt SvERu −−−−= 1lnˆlnˆln 210 γγβ)      (5) 
 
The short-run model is a difference equation with an Error Correction term, namely 
the lagged error described by Equation (5): 
( ) ( ) 132210 ln1lnlnln −+Δ+−Δ+Δ+=Δ ttttt uSvER ααααα    5  (6) 
 
Given the equation above, the rent can be viewed as adjusting according to the short-
run changes in the variables, and to the lagged market imbalance. 
 
The model was tested using the London data set (Hendershott et al., 2002).  In the 
current study, the Hong Kong data set for each sub-market and the office market as a 
whole is to be used.  The increase of employment of the tenants of the office means 
the increase in demand, thus the expected sign for α1 is expected to be positive.  The 
increase of total area available means an increase in supply, therefore the sign for α2 
should be negative.  The rental price will adjust on the opposite direction of the error 
term, thus α3 will be negative.  Particularly, α3 = 1 means complete adjustment to the 
previous error.   
 
The expected signs of estimated coefficients in this model are summarized below: 
  
Variable Expected Sign of Estimated Coefficient 
Equation (4) 
   Ln E + 
   Ln [S*(1-v)] – 
 
Equation (6) 
   Δln E + 
   Δln [S*(1-v)] – 
                                                 
( )tv
5 The equation here is different from the original equation in the reference paper Hendershott et al. 
(2002) , in that the coefficients of ( )tSlnΔ  are set to be the same. −Δ  and 1ln
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    Rε (t-1) – 
Table 3: Expected Sign of Estimated Coefficient for Model 1 
 
In this study, two types of vacancy rate are used to test the model.  One is the constant 
natural vacancy rate, here assuming to be the average of vacancy rate throughout the 
data set period for simplification; the other is the forecast vacancy rate6 from the 
observed data.  
 
When natural vacancy rate (v*) is used, it has the same effect as the vacancy rate 
variable is dropped.  In Hendershott et al. (2002), the model without vacancy rate 
variable has the poorest explanatory power for the long run with 70% adjusted R2, but 
the highest for the short run, with 81% adjusted R2. 
 
However, the assumption of constant natural vacancy rate is far from reality.  
Therefore, the time varying nature is incorporated by forecasting the actual vacancy 
rate from ARMA model (Hendershott et al., 2002).  When forecast vacancy rate (f_v) 
is used, the new set of data is a simplified approach of simulating the natural vacancy 
rate.  
 
As mentioned before, according to Hendershott et al. (2002), the ECM model has 
some advantages.  First, the coefficients have useful economic interpretations because 
it is based on a structural model of the space market.  Second, it does not require 
estimates of real interest rates and the required real estate risk premium.  Third, the 
ECM can be used in studies where metropolitan vacancy rate data are unavailable, in 
that the model without the vacancy rate has greater explanatory power. 
 
Error-Correction in System (Englund et al., 2008) 
Despite the advantages of the ECM model mentioned in the paper (Hendershott et al., 
2002), some factors were missed.  Because the tenants are “locked” by lease terms, 
there would be temporary higher vacancy rate.  The deviation of the vacancy rate 
                                                 
6 Auto-Regressive and Moving Average Model (ARMA) is used to get the moving average of vacancy 
rate.  The result is then forecasted into forecast vacancy rate. 
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 from the natural rate would not be simply a mirror image of the deviation of rent from 
its equilibrium level. 
 
A more comprehensive model of adjustment process was proposed (Englund et al., 
2008), and it was suggested that the rent should adjust not only to the vacancy rate, 
but also to the gap between the equilibrium and actual rent levels and to the change in 
the determinants of equilibrium rent, which can be represented as: 
( ) ( ) *1* 11* 11 lnlnlnlnlnln * tRttRttvttt RRRvvRRR Δ+−+−=−=Δ −−−−− βββ  (7) 
where asterisks denote equilibrium values, vβ denotes the coefficient for vacancy rate 
gap, Rβ for the rent gap, and *Rβ  for the equilibrium change. 
 
By including the error correction, similarly in the case of Equation (4) and (6), the 
standard error-correction equation with the addition of lagged vacancies (implicitly 
the gap between lagged vacancies and the constant natural vacancy rate) as an extra 
disequilibrium indicator is as follows: 
tStEtRRtvt SEvR lnlnln 1,10 Δ+Δ+++=Δ −− ββεβββ    (8) 
where ( )*lnln RRR −=ε
v
 is the residual from co-integrating long-run regression as 
Equation (4).  β , Rβ , and Sβ are expected to be negative. 
 
For the dynamics of vacancies, an analogue to Equation (8) is posited: 
tStEtRRtvt SEvv lnln1,10 Δ+Δ+++=Δ −− ηηεηηη     (9) 
where Rη  (expected to be positive) and vη  (expected to be negative) are the responses 
of the vacancy rate to the initial rent and vacancy rate gaps, and Eη (expected to be 
negative) and Sη (expected to be positive) indicate the impact of concurrent shocks to 
employment and supply. 
 
The traditional theory of determinants of supply suggests that new construction is 
triggered when the property values are sufficiently high relative to construction costs.  
Considering the generally two or more years of construction period, the time lag from 
the disequilibrium indicators to the increase in supply may be longer than the 
corresponding 1-year lag in the rent and vacancy adjustment equations (Englund et al., 
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 2008, p.101).  With same principle, the changes in employment also take time to 
affect the current supply.  Therefore, the supply model is: 
−− ++=Δ Rvt vS εϕϕϕ ε0ln        (10) 
where vϕ is expected to be negative, and zϕ  is expected to be positive. The variables 
 and −v −Rε indicate an unspecified time lag from the time of decision making to the 
time of new office supply. 
 
Considering the Equations (8), (9), and (10) as a whole system with the possibility of 
correlation, the seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) method is used.  The lagged 
period is to be determined by trail-and-error. 
 
The employment is also adjusted away from the previous disequilibrium to the 
equilibrium level: 
10 lnln −Δ+=Δ tE EE ψψ        (11) 
This equation will be estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS). 
 
In the second model, the expected signs of the estimated coefficients, if significant, 
are summarized in Table 3: 
 
Variable Expected Sign of Estimated Coefficient 
Equation (8) 
   ΔLn S – 
   ΔLn E + 
   v(t-1) – 
   Rε (t-1) – 
 
Equation (9) 
   Δln S + 
   Δln E – 
   v(t-1) – 
   Rε (t-1) + 
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 Equation (10) 
    −v – 
   −Rε  + 
  
Equation (11) 
   Δln E(t-1) ? 
Table 4: Expected Sign of Estimated Coefficient for Model 2 
 
It should be mentioned that, the coefficient of Rε (t-1) in Equation (9) may be 
insignificant for Grade A office, as vacancy rate may not adjust to the external shock 
based on the previous theoretical analysis. 
 
Test Statistics 
For the current study, the p-value from the t-statistics of each independent variable, as 
well as the adjusted R2, and Durbin-Watson statistics and probability of F-statistics of 
each equation, will be presented. 
 
T-statistics and P-value  
T-statistics is used to test the significance of the effect of independent variable on the 
dependent variable.  The value of t depends on the coefficient and the standard 
deviation: 
i
i
Sb
b=it  
where  bi is the coefficient of variable i and 
Sbi is the standard error of coefficient.   
The larger the value, the more accurate the estimate, the less likely that bi = 0. 
 
P-value is usually derived from t-statistics after incorporating the degree of freedom.  
The degree of freedom is calculated as: 
d.f. = N – k – 1 
where  N is number of observations and 
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  k is number of independent variables excluding the intercept. 
 
In this study, p-value will be reported so as to present the level of significance more 
directly. 
 
Adjusted R2  
The adjusted R2 is derived from coefficient of determination, R2, by taking the degree 
of freedom into consideration: 
( )
kN
NRR −
−−−= 111 22  
 
The adjusted R2 measures the proportion of variance of the dependent variable 
explained by the variance of independent variables.  Considering that the degree of 
freedom of this study is not large enough, the R2 should be adjusted downward, thus 
adjusted R2 is presented in this study. 
 
It should be noted that adjusted R2 is not the sole criteria for model selection. 
 
F-statistics and Probability of F-statistics 
F-statistics is used to test the significance of the R2 statistic.  The F-test is used to test 
the null hypothesis that none of the independent variable helps to explain the 
variations of the dependent variable about its mean. 
 
Again, p-value of F-statistics will be presented in the current study so as to present the 
significant level more directly.  If p-value of F-statistics is smaller than the required 
significance level, the null hypothesis is rejected.  
 
Durbin-Watson Statistics  
The Durbin-Watson Statistics is used to test the presence of autocorrelation in 
the residuals from a regression analysis. 
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 When the DW statistics equals 2, it indicates that there is no autocorrelation.  If the 
statistics is substantially less than 2, it implies positive serial correlation.  Generally, 
attention is required when DW statistics is less than 1.0. 
 
On the other hand, if the statistics is larger than 2, then the successive error terms are 
negatively correlated, which can imply an underestimation of the significance level. 
 
For the current study, the DW statistics is not important, especially for the long-run 
equations (Equations (4)).  Still, the data will be presented to provide more 
comprehensive information of the regression model. 
 
Section Summary  
With the test statistics shown in the result, the choice of model will mainly depend on 
the p-value of the coefficients, adjusted R2 and the p-value of F-statistics.  The DW 
statistics is presented here mainly for reference. 
 
Chapter Summary 
Two models, one by Hendershott et al. (2002) and one by Englund et al. (2008) will 
be tested using the data of the office sub-markets in Hong Kong, namely Grade A, B 
and C offices. 
 
The first model will be tested under two conditions, one is constant vacancy rate, 
which shows high explanatory power in Hendershott et al. (2002), and the other is 
moving average vacancy rate, which can be regarded as natural vacancy, a variable 
commonly used in other studies on rental adjustment. 
 
The second model will be tested using the related data in respective office sub-
markets.  As Equation (8) is actually derived from the long-term model, which is 
similar to Equation (4), the data in Equation (8) will be chosen from constant vacancy 
rate or forecasted rate, whichever fits the first model better. 
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 V  Data 
Thanks to the statistical information system available in Hong Kong, most of the key 
statistics of the region can be dated back into decades before.  As to the data for 
separate office sub-markets by quality, which are nominated by Grade A, B and C, 
they are also available back to the 1980s, helping to establish a study on the duration 
of 26 years, from 1981 to 2007. 
 
Description and Source of Variables 
The table below summarizes the variables in the models, and the sources of them: 
 
Symbol Description Source 
R (A/B/C) Rental indices for Grade 
A/B/C 
Property Review, Rating and Valuation 
Department, HKSAR 
 
Monthly Market Statistics, Rating and 
Valuation Department, HKSAR 
S (A/B/C) The stock of Grade 
A/B/C 
Property Review, Rating and Valuation 
Department, HKSAR 
v (A/B/C) The vacancy rate for 
Grade A/B/C and for the 
whole office market 
Property Review, Rating and Valuation 
Department, HKSAR 
v* (A/B/C) Natural vacancy for 
Grade A/B/C 
Deduced variable from v (A/B/C) by 
averaging of the vacancy rate for the 
whole period 
f_v (A/B/C) Forecast vacancy rate  Deduced variable from v (A/B/C) 
using Auto-Regressive and Moving 
Average Model (ARMA) method 
PCED Private Consumer 
Expenditure Deflator 
Annual Digest, Census and Statistics 
Department, HKSAR 
E (A/B/C) Number of people 
engaged in Grade A/B/C 
Annual Digest, Census and Statistics 
Department, HKSAR 
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 Rε  The error correction term 
from long-run regression 
Deduced variable from long-run 
equation 
Table 5: Description and Source of Variables  
 
Data Processing 
Among the variables in the two models, certain processing is required so as to turn the 
raw data into what can be used in this study.  All the data are adjusted into mid-year 
ones so as to be consistent with each other. 
 
Rental Indices 
According to the Technical Notes (Rating and Valuation Department, 2009), the 
rental indices “are designed to measure rental and price changes with quality kept at 
a constant”. In addition, “annual indices are the simple average of the monthly 
indices in respect of the relevant period”.  
 
Figure 8 shows the movement of rental indices throughout the period under study: 
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Figure 8: Normal Rental Indices (1999=100) 
 
The rent information is obtained from various sources including fresh lettings, site 
visits by the staff of the Department, etc.  But average rents are for reference only, 
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 since the rent is determined not only by value, but also characteristics of the 
respective premises such as quality, location, and the like.  Compared with rental 
prices, the rental indices are better indications in reflecting change in value, by 
keeping quality at a constant level. 
 
The rental indices are not free of defects.  The rental indices may tend to “understate 
market trends” (Rating and Valuation Department, 2009), since there will be some 
contractual terms unknown to the Department. “In a ‘tenants market’ for example, 
landlords are normally prepared to make concessions to tenants such as 
refurbishment or the granting of extended rent-free periods. If rents were adjusted to 
reflect standard terms of agreement, the rents as adjusted would tend to be lower than 
the quoted rents when the index is moving downwards and vice versa” (Rating and 
Valuation Department, 2009).  However, considering that the impact of such terms 
contributes only a small portion to the rents, and considering the availability of data, 
the rental indices by Rating and Valuation Department will be taken for the current 
study.  
 
Another problem is that the indices have not considered the inflation factor.  In order 
to get the real rental indices, the nominal indices should be deflated.  In this study, the 
private consumer expenditure deflator is used. 
 
Private Consumer Expenditure Deflator 
According to Census and Statistics Department (2005), the private consumer 
expenditure (PCE) refers to “the value of final consumption expenditure on goods and 
services by households and private non-profit institutions serving households”.  In 
addition, the PCE is “a comprehensive measure of household overall spending on 
consumption goods (purchased from various channels including the conventional 
retail outlets) and services purchased locally or outside Hong Kong”. 
 
The PCE deflator is derived from private consumer expenditure at current market and 
in chained (2006) dollars. 
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 In this study, PCE deflator rather than GDP deflator is used, since the PCE deflator is 
a better measurement of the inflation among private sectors. 
 
Figure 9 shows the change of the deflator from 1981: 
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Figure 9: Private Consumption Expenditure Deflator 
 
It can be observed from the figure that the inflation is high for the first twenty years 
since 1981, and then became more stable. 
 
Stock 
Stock of offices is recorded at year end.  In order to be consistent with other data, the 
figures are modified into mid-year ones by simply averaging the two successive year-
end data. 
 
Throughout the period under study, it can be found that there has been continuous 
increase in the stock of Grade A offices.  The amount of stock at the end of the study 
period is almost six times that of the beginning.   
 
However, the stock of Grade B and C offices has not gone through such great increase.  
The stock of Grade B offices has increased by slightly more than two times, while that 
of Grade C offices is less than tripled. 
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The trend of increase is shown in Figure 10: 
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Figure 10: Private Office – Stock at Mid-year 
 
Vacancy Rate 
According to the Rating and Valuation Department (2008), vacancy means “a unit 
was not physically occupied at the time of the survey conducted at the end of the year”. 
In addition, “premises under decoration are classified as vacant”, and “some 
vacancies could be due to units not yet issued with the Certificate of Compliance or 
Consent to Assign, which therefore could not have been occupied”. 
 
The vacancy rate is derived from the vacancy divided by stock at year end.  Similarly, 
the vacancy rate is adjusted into mid-year figure. 
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Figure 11: Private Office – Vacancy Rate at Mid-year 
 
The forecasted vacancy rate is deduced from the actual vacancy rate using the method 
of ARMA. 
 
Employment  
According to Census and Statistics Department (2005), the industry breakdowns of 
employment statistics are “based on the Hong Kong Standard Industrial 
Classification Version 1.1 (HSIC V1.1), which is modelled on the United Nations' 
International Standard Industrial Classification (Revision 2) (ISIC Rev. 2), with 
adaptation for the industrial structure of the local economy”. 
 
Some samples are picked randomly to determine the tenant types in office of different 
grade.  The evidence shows that tenants in Grade A offices (high-end) are mainly 
from finance sectors, Grade B offices are occupied by tenants in insurance, real estate 
and medical/dental industries, while tenants in Grade C offices (low-end) involve in 
different industries.  
 
The author has visited several offices of different grade and investigated the industries 
of tenants.  For the case of this study, the employment data for offices of each grade 
include persons engaged in:  
- Financing, insurance, real estate and business services 
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 o Finance institutions 
for Grade A; 
 
- Financing, insurance, real estate and business services 
o Insurance 
o Real estate 
o Business services except machinery and equipment rental and leasing 
- Community, social and personal services 
o Medical, dental, other health and veterinary services 
for Grade B; and 
 
- Manufacturing 
o Textiles 
o Printing, publishing and allied industries 
- Financing, insurance, real estate and business services 
o Insurance 
o Real estate 
o Business services except machinery and equipment rental and leasing 
- Community, social and personal services 
o Sanitary and similar services 
o Medical, dental, other health and veterinary services 
o Business, professional and labour associations 
o Other social and related community services 
for Grade C. 
 
All the figures have been modified into mid-year ones by averaging method.  The 
change of the person engaged in respective industries is shown in Figure 12: 
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Figure 12: Persons Engaged in Selective Private Sectors 
 
Actually various sets of employment data for Grade C offices have been tried for this 
study, according to the evidence in the real life and also the results of the tests, and 
finally the above composition of data is used. 
 
Questions may rise on the double counting problem between Grade B and Grade C 
demands, in that persons engaged in the following industries are counted in the 
employment data for both Grade B and Grade C offices:  
o Insurance,  
o Real estate,  
o Business services except machinery and equipment rental and leasing, 
and  
o Medical, dental, other health and veterinary services  
 
The demand from the above industries does exist for both office sub-markets, and any 
attempts to divide the demand between Grade B and Grade C are too discretional.  
Therefore, the same data is used in both sub-markets. 
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 Chapter Summary 
The data used in this study are summarized as follows: 
 
 
Minimum Maximum Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Rental Indices 
   A 43.60 184.44 106.17 41.71 
   B 40.90 186.68 106.62 43.32 
   C 45.00 169.40 100.59 38.21 
PCE Deflator 0.38 1.14 0.82 0.25 
Stock 
   A 1,201,759 5,765,700 3,639,730 1,498,021 
   B 769,061 2,446,350 1,664,172 548,174 
   C 613,930 1,609,850 1,213,481 321,324 
 
Vacancy Rate 
   A 4.75% 17.40% 9.56% 3.37% 
   B 2.90% 22.50% 11.66% 4.85% 
   C 2.85% 18.35% 11.39% 4.54% 
 
Employment 
   A 70,810 144,184 112,786 24,278 
   B 93,699 442,614 261,738 113,638 
   C 265,207  567,628  412,101 93,128 
Table 6: Descriptive Statistics of Data 
 
All the data are adjusted to mid-year measurement in real terms, covering a period 
from 1981 to 2007.  The price level is set at 2006. 
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 VI  Results and Discussions 
With the help of the software, EViews Version 3.0, the two models are tested with 
data mentioned in the previous chapter.  The results are illustrated in this chapter, with 
discussions on the result. 
 
The Basic Error Correction Model 
Using Constant Vacancy Rate 
When the vacancy rate is assumed to be stationary for the whole period, the result for 
different sub-markets and the whole market is as follows: 
 
Variable Grade A Grade B Grade C 
Long-run 
   Intercept -5.134991* 
(0.0121) 
27.28708* 
(0.0000) 
7.367324* 
(0.0123) 
   Ln E 2.817643* 
(0.0000) 
2.225741* 
(0.0000) 
2.411320 * 
(0.0111) 
   Ln S -1.512535* 
(0.0000) 
-3.498556* 
(0.0000) 
-2.409529* 
(0.0028) 
Adjusted R2 73.62% 76.09% 34.41% 
F-statistics 37.28650 
(0.000000) 
42.37563 
(0.000000) 
7.821558 
(0.002424) 
DW 0.708235 0.736733 0.157375 
 
Short-run 
   Intercept -0.006401 
(0.8833) 
-0.089847 
(0.1073) 
-0.073757 
(0.0726) 
   Δln E 3.548858* 
(0.0003) 
4.583751* 
(0.0001) 
4.580534* 
(0.0001) 
   Δln S -1.666644* 
(0.0016) 
-4.491394* 
(0.0000) 
-2.159706* 
(0.0003) 
   Rε (t-1) -0.486618* -0.719783* -0.091959 
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 (0.0434) (0.0048) (0.2494) 
Adjusted R2 52. 75% 58.73% 62.20% 
F-statistics 10.30304 
(0.000195) 
12.86017 
(0.000046) 
14.70979 
(0.000018) 
DW 1.792136 1.524227 1.519034 
* Significant at 5% level. 
P-values are in parentheses.  
DW is the Durbin-Watson statistic. 
Table 7: The Error Correction Models with Constant Vacancy Rate 
 
The results above show that the Equation (4) and (6) fit best in the case of Grade B 
offices for the long-run, and of Grade C for the short-run, with signs as expected and 
higher adjusted R2. 
 
Almost all the independent variables are significant at 5% level, and many are 
significant at 1% level.  The only independent variable that is not significant is the 
error correction term for Grade C market, which actually confirms our prediction that 
the low-end market, here Grade C market, which has higher transaction cost, is slower 
in adjusting rental price, compared with other sub-markets. 
 
Notice should be cast on the short-run result for Grade A and Grade B markets.  The 
error correction term is significant at 5% level for Grade A market, while at 1% level 
for Grade B market.  The result implies that Grade B office owners adjust to the rental 
disequilibrium most swiftly by 72% within a year, while Grade A office owners are 
less responsive, by 49% a year.  This evidence seems to be contrary to our hypothesis, 
which implies that the Grade A office market should be more responsive than Grade 
B market due to less transaction cost.  However, the difference is not significant7.  
                                                 
7 The T-statistics of the difference between Grade A and Grade B market is calculated as: 
( ) ( ) 722420.0
0.2293960.227043
719783.0486618.0
2222
21
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=+
−−−=+
−=
XX ss
XXt , 
with degree of freedom at (26-3-1)=22, the difference is not significant at 10% level. 
The difference between Grade A and Grade C market, on the other hand, is significant at 10% level, 
with t-value equals to 1.644562. 
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 Furthermore, as mentioned before, there are some defects of this model.  One should 
not rush to the conclusion that the hypotheses are rejected before the test of the second 
model is conducted. 
 
In the study by Hendershott et al. (2002), the result long-run model was satisfactory 
with all coefficients correctly signed and significantly different from zero. The model 
had the strongest explanatory power when the stock and the vacancy rate was 
considered together as a single variable, as ln [Stock * (1-v)].  In the short-run model 
of that study, the employment, vacancy rate and error correction coefficients were all 
correctly signed and statistically significant.  The short-term model worked best when 
the vacancy rate variable was dropped, as in the current study.  The ECM coefficient 
was -0.95 in Hendershott et al. (2002), meaning that the disequilibrium was adjusted 
by 95% after one year. 
 
The poor explanatory power in the case of Grade C office relies in the determination 
of the drive of the demand.  Different from Grade A and B offices tenants, where 
certain industries can be attributed to, the tenants of Grade C offices come from 
various industries.  Despite that there are many social institutions, some tenants 
actually belong to the manufacturing industry as Grade C office is a close substitute of 
industrial buildings, and it may be used as an office for manufacturers.  Due to the 
ambiguity of market demand, the model is poor in explaining the Grade C market. 
 
Using Forecast Vacancy Rate 
In reality, natural vacancy rate changes over time.  The assumption of constant 
vacancy rate over nearly three decades is far from the actual situation.  Therefore, 
another test was done by simulating the changing natural vacancy rate.  The result of 
the test is shown below: 
 
Variable Grade A Grade B Grade C 
Long-run 
   Intercept -5.759102* 
(0.0213) 
20.54859* 
(0.0004) 
10.30453* 
(0.0041) 
- 60 - 
    Ln E 2.846601* 
(0.0000) 
1.511340* 
(0.0175) 
-0.435422 
(0.7028) 
   Ln [S*(1-v)] -1.503554* 
(0.0000) 
-2.430465* 
(0.0082) 
0.007363 
(0.9939) 
Adjusted R2 63.59% 24.42% 4.17% 
F-statistics 23.70820 
(0.000002) 
5.199787 
(0.013301) 
1.566153 
(0.229453) 
DW 0.646261 0.504761 0.273555 
 
Short-run 
   Intercept -0.036091 
(0.4195) 
-0.167695 
(0.0704) 
-0.127166* 
(0.0062) 
   Δln E 4.213453* 
(0.0002) 
3.170525 
(0.0940) 
5.635377* 
(0.0002) 
   Δln [S*(1-v)] -1.443704* 
(0.0136) 
-0.864856 
(0.5633) 
-1.564234* 
(0.0301) 
   Rε (t-1) -0.523115* 
(0.0238) 
-0.239917 
(0.3083) 
-0.164975* 
(0.0423) 
Adjusted R2 43.71% 2.78% 45.62% 
F-statistics 7.471630 
(0.001258) 
1.238243 
(0.319723) 
7.990817 
(0.000873) 
DW 1.784971 0.811470 1.479393 
* Significant at 5% level. 
P-values are in parentheses.  
DW is the Durbin-Watson statistic. 
Table 8: Error Correction Model with Forecast Vacancy Rate 
 
With forecast vacancy, the model runs well in sub-market A, but not in B for the short 
run or C for the long run.  Even for Grade A office market, the equation is not 
considered to be of stronger explanatory power than when constant vacancy is 
assumed. 
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 Based on the coefficient and p-values of the error correction term in three markets, the 
result, again, shows contrary to the hypothesis.  The rent of Grade A market seems to 
adjust 52% within one year, greater than 16% in Grade C market.  However, the rent 
of Grade B market seems to be unaffected, which is the opposite of the result in the 
previous case where Grade B market shows greatest response. 
 
Section Summary 
Considering the above results of the model by using two sets of data, the assumption 
of constant vacancy rate is suggested to be taken in the study if Equation (4) and (6) is 
adopted in light of the higher adjusted R2. 
 
However, compared with the adjusted R2 in the reference paper (Hendershott et al., 
2002) where the figures ranges from 69% to 81% in both short run and long run, the 
same model doesn’t seem to have very good explanatory power with the data in Hong 
Kong with the highest adjusted R2 at 76.09% while the lowest at 34.41%.  The 
Durbin-Watson statistic, though away from 2 showing evidence of positive serial 
correlation, is not of great concern in this model. 
 
Possible reason for the poorer explanatory power is that the period under study covers 
the change of sovereignty which caused many guesses and speculations in the market8.  
The fundamental assumptions for the supply and demand model were violated greatly, 
causing some abnormal market performances during the period.  The effect of those 
events can not be incorporated in a model with the rental adjustment alone, thus the 
explanatory power is poor. 
 
Despite the relatively lower explanatory power of the same model, we can still 
observe the difference between at least Grade A and Grade C markets.  In either test, 
Grade A market appears to adjust more swiftly in rental prices, evidenced by higher 
Rε  compared with that of Grade C market.  The performance of Grade B, however, 
seems contradictive in two tests.  In light of the argument of the existence of hidden 
                                                 
8 It is evidenced by larger residual value before 1997. 
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 vacancy (Englund et al., 2008), the more comprehensive model is necessary to allow 
separate adjustment of rent and vacancy. 
 
Revised ECM Using SUR 
In order to determine the adjustment of vacancy rate as well as that of the rental prices, 
the rental price, the dynamics of vacancy rate, the change in supply and demand are 
studied as a whole.  As the above results show that the assumption of constant natural 
vacancy rate fits the model better, same assumption is taken in the second model. 
 
The result of the SUR of Equations (8), (9), and (10), as well as the OLS result of 
Equation (11) is presented in the following table: 
 
Grade A Grade B Grade C 
Rent 
Intercept -0.148993 
(0.0716) 
Intercept -0.173507 
(0.0799) 
Intercept 0.158083 
(0.0605) 
ΔlnR(t-1) 0.419826* 
(0.0128) 
ΔlnR(t-1) 0.264634 
(0.1586) 
ΔlnR(t-1) -0.146692 
(0.3526) 
ΔlnS -1.213023* 
(0.0032) 
ΔlnS -4.270723* 
(0.0000) 
ΔlnS -2.649621* 
(0.0000) 
ΔlnE 4.734454* 
(0.0000) 
ΔlnE 4.924494* 
(0.0000) 
ΔlnE 3.022459* 
(0.0016) 
v(t-1) 1.032635 
(0.1465) 
v(t-1) 0.521389 
(0.4147) 
v(t-1) -1.509657* 
(0.0103) 
Rε  (t-1) -0.931853* 
(0.0000) 
Rε  (t-1) -0.840855* 
(0.0005) 
Rε  (t-1) -0.214525* 
(0.0100) 
Adjusted R2 62.71% Adjusted R2 63.20% Adjusted R2 65.83% 
DW 2.057798 DW 1.822436 DW 1.471005 
 
Vacancy rate 
Intercept 0.042992* 
(0.0001) 
Intercept 0.069002* 
(0.0005) 
Intercept 0.026410 
(0.0705) 
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 ΔlnS 0.289444* 
(0.0000) 
ΔlnS 0.837748* 
(0.0000) 
ΔlnS 0.291975* 
(0.0004) 
ΔlnE -0.404669* 
(0.0001) 
ΔlnE -0.578701* 
(0.0019) 
ΔlnE -0.605965* 
(0.0016) 
v(t-1) -0.532596* 
(0.0000) 
v(t-1) -0.595941* 
(0.0000) 
v(t-1) -0.171152 
(0.0645) 
Rε  (t-1) 0.019298 
(0.4698) 
Rε  (t-1) 0.037606 
(0.3427) 
Rε  (t-1) 0.035112* 
(0.0281) 
Adjusted R2 59.25% Adjusted R2 57.12% Adjusted R2 38.77% 
DW 1.143728 DW 1.120672 DW 0.903065 
 
Supply 
Intercept 0.101821* 
(0.0000) 
Intercept 0.025256 
(0.1049) 
Intercept 0.047359* 
(0.0002) 
v(t-2) -0.584723* 
(0.0004) 
v(t-2) 0.054665 
(0.6575) 
v(t-2) -0.227060* 
(0.0272) 
Rε  (t-5) 0.097830* 
(0.0045) 
Rε  (t-5) 0.111353* 
(0.0008) 
Rε  (t-5) 0.052854* 
(0.0182) 
Adjusted R2 50.57% Adjusted R2 34.29% Adjusted R2 14.29% 
DW 1.874586 DW 1.132664 DW 0.846134 
 
Employment 
Intercept 0.009163 
(0.2234) 
Intercept 0.017788 
(0.0626) 
Intercept 0.016389* 
(0.0177) 
ΔlnE(t-1) 0.619655* 
(0.0007) 
ΔlnE(t-1) 0.654298* 
(0.0001) 
ΔlnE(t-1) 0.439338* 
(0.0282) 
Adjusted R2 37.27% Adjusted R2 48.77% Adjusted R2 15.74% 
DW 0.977660 DW 1.424522 DW 1.627626 
 
* Significant at 5% level. 
P-values are in parentheses.  
DW is the Durbin-Watson statistic. 
Table 9: Error Correction Model Using SUR 
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The signs for all the significant variables are consistent with the expectation.  When 
the SUR method is used, Equation (8) has strong explanatory power compared to its 
counterparty, Equation (6), in the first model, i.e., the adjusted R2 of the rent equation 
of Grade A, B, and C is higher than that of the short-run results in the first model.   
 
Rental Adjustment 
For the rental adjustment equation, the Rε  of  Grade A is -0.9318, meaning the rental 
price will adjust roughly 93% of error in one year, which is much higher compared 
with the study in Stockholm (Englund et al., 2008), where the figure was 37.8%.  The 
rental adjustment of Grade B is about 84%, and that of Grade C is around 21%.  The 
sensitive rent adjustment in Hong Kong office market is mainly caused by the shorter 
lease term, usually two or three years, compared with that in foreign countries, which 
can be five years or more.  With shorter lease terms, the parties can negotiate on the 
rental price more frequently and adjust to the market value. 
 
Both Grade A and B offices rents seem to have no significant adjustment to the 
vacancy rate of the previous period, given the insignificant lagged one period vacancy 
rate implying that the vacancy in the previous period has little impact on the rent level 
in the current period. In contrast, the previous impact of vacancy rate on Grade C 
offices causes rental prices to vary accordingly.  Changes in both supply and demand 
have impact on the rent adjustment as expected. 
 
Vacancy Adjustment 
The vacancy rate of Grade A and Grade B offices are relatively stable with regard to 
the rental prices, in light of the insignificant error term Rε .  The adjustment of vacancy 
rate for Grade A and B offices mainly comes from the reviewing of the vacancy rate 
in the previous period, and the changes in supply and demand aspects. 
 
It should be highlighted that the error correction term Rε  (t-1), which denotes market 
disequilibrium, has almost no impact on the vacancy adjustment of Grade A and 
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 Grade B offices, implying that the vacancy of Grade A and B offices adjusted little to 
the market shock. 
 
In contrast, the vacancy rate of Grade C offices changes according to the error 
correction of rental prices by roughly 4%, but the vacancy rate in the previous period 
has less influence.  For vacancy adjustment of Grade C offices, the error term Rε  
plays a more important role compared with that in the other two sub-markets. 
 
By comparing the result of the first two equations, it can be found that, if demand 
changes, rental price will change faster than vacancy rate does.  This situation is two 
folded.  When there is a rise in demand, then the owner will raise the rental price.  
While during a decrease in demand, the owners are also willing to adjust price.  The 
phenomenon in Hong Kong shows higher flexibility of rental price than the situation 
in foreign cities, which can be supported by the shorter length of lease in Hong Kong, 
and the higher rental price.  If the rental price is not adjusted but the unit left vacant, 
the cost can be huge. 
 
Supply Adjustment 
The supply adjustment performance is generally similar among different sectors.  For 
Grade A offices, the supply will be adjusted by 58% according to the vacancy rate 
lagged two periods, and by 10% according to the disequilibrium of rental prices 
lagged five periods. 
 
The adjustment of supply in Grade B offices mainly relies greater on disequilibrium 
rather than vacancy rate.  The supply will adjust 11% based on the disequilibrium of 
rental prices lagged five periods. 
 
The adjustment of Grade C office markets seems more similar to that of Grade A 
offices, in that the supply adjust downward by 23% with the vacancy rate lagged two 
periods, and by 5% with disequilibrium of rental prices lagged five periods. 
 
The number of years basically reflects the time required for decision making and 
construction.  As the prescribed procedure of developing a new office building is 
- 66 - 
 identical for all office building, it is not surprising that the results of three sub-markets 
are similar.  Still, the adjustment in supply for Grade C office building is to a smaller 
extent compared with other sub-markets, mainly due to the consideration of lower 
demand for Grade C offices from the market. 
 
Employment Adjustment 
The employment adjustment of all the sub-markets shows that the employment tends 
to follow the trend of the previous period.  The employment will adjust by 62% on the 
previous trend for Grade A market.  And for Grade B and C, the adjustment is 65% 
and 44% respectively. 
 
Section Summary 
The result of the SUR model has shown that Grade A, B and C sub-markets perform 
differently in terms of rental and vacancy adjustment. 
 
For Hypothesis 1: Compared with low-end offices, rental levels of high-end offices 
are more responsive to external shocks, ceteris paribus, it can not be rejected.  It can 
be seen from the result of rental and vacancy adjustment equations that the vacancy 
rate has little impact on rent adjustment, and the rent error has little impact on 
vacancy adjustment.  The rental price of Grade A office, or high-end office, adjusts 
mainly through the error correction term lagged one period with an amount of more 
than 93%, which is much higher than the that in the study in Stockholm (Englund et 
al., 2008), mainly because of the much shorter lease term in Hong Kong.  In 
comparison, the rental price for Grade C offices, the low-end offices in Hong Kong, 
adjusts for about 21% in a year.  The adjustment of Grade B office rent, by 84%, lies 
in between. 
 
For Hypothesis 2: Compared with low-end offices, vacancy rates of high-end offices 
are less responsive to external shocks, ceteris paribus, it can not be rejected either.  In 
the vacancy rate equation, the disequilibrium of rental price influences vacancy rate 
only for the Grade C office market, the low-end office market, but not for Grade A or 
B market. 
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Actually, such kind of quicker adjustment in vacancy rate rather than rental prices 
when there is a change in demand is common in many foreign cities such as 
Stockholm (Englund et al., 2008).  However, the phenomenon exists only in low-end 
office market in Hong Kong.  Such phenomenon implies a higher transaction cost in 
foreign cities and regions. 
 
The result of Grade B office market shows a smooth transition from Grade A office to 
Grade C office, implying that a consistent increase in transaction cost from high-end 
office market to low-end office market does cause consistent change from rent to 
vacancy as major adjustment tool.  When transaction cost is low, for high-end offices 
like Grade A ones, the rent adjustment responses to a larger extent.  When the 
transaction cost is high, for low-end offices like the Grade C ones, the vacancy rate 
will play the major role of adjustment. 
 
It might be argued that the above findings are not in line with the empirical statistics, 
which indicate that the volatility (standard deviation) of rental price and vacancy rate 
is higher for Grade B offices.  The volatility of Grade C rental price is the lowest, 
while the volatility of Grade A vacancy rate is the lowest.  It should be noted that one 
can not simply compare the volatility of rent and vacancy rate. Different office sub-
markets are subject to different kinds of demand and supply shocks.  The drive of the 
adjustments is different, thus the change of rental price and vacancy rate requires in-
depth study rather than calculating the standard deviation alone. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
Apart from the transaction costs as illustrated theoretically and empirically above, 
there could be probably other reasons that contribute to the difference in rent and 
vacancy adjustment.   
 
First is the substitution effect.  The vacancy cost of Grade C offices is lower 
compared with offices with higher quality, so the owner of Grade C offices are willing 
to wait for higher rental prices expected in the near future.  Since the Grade C market 
has a close substitute, the industrial market, the owners do not want to charge very 
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 high prices even in the booming market, for afraid of the termination of rental streams.  
In addition, as the tenants in Grade C offices are from various industries, this 
diversifies the specific performances of individual industry, and leads to a low 
volatility of demand.  As the demand is relatively stable, there is less intention to 
adjust the rental downward during bear market. 
 
Another reason may be attributed to the ownership of the building.  Grade A offices 
usually have single owner, but multi-ownership is more common for Grade C offices. 
 
In the case of single owner, “knock-on effect” may occur.  When there are many 
vacant spaces in an office building with single owner, the message is that the owner is 
charging too high a rental price, thus the existing tenants will negotiate with the owner 
for a lower price or a termination, which causes even higher vacancy rate.  In order to 
prevent the vicious cycle, single owner of an office building is reluctant to keep many 
units vacant.  Also, since they have the rental information of every unit in their own 
building, they can easily optimize the rental price and occupancy rate of the building 
to maximize their profit by periodic reviews.  However, for multi-owners, that effect 
is not strong enough to deter them from renting out a unit with lower prices, since the 
owners are different.  
 
The effect of the ownership can be tested by separating the offices of same sub-
markets into two subsectors, one with single owner and the other with multiple 
owners, and then checking whether the adjustment shows significant differences. 
 
In addition, the moving cost in changing the office location is also a concern, which is 
seldom mentioned in literatures, but also requires attention since it occurs under some 
occasions.  For large enterprises, the moving cost should be high due to the original 
scale of office space, number of staff, and amount of document.  Small and medium 
business may have much lower moving cost.  However, considering the high rental 
prices in Hong Kong, the moving cost, which is a one-time expense, does not take up 
a substantial portion of the company expenses.  And when it is compared with losses 
due to information cost, it seems to have less influence since it does not appear in the 
process of every transaction when both new lease arrangement and renewal are 
considered. 
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If the hypothesis can not be rejected and the vacancy rate does not adjust with rental 
price when there is a market shock for Grade A market, another reason should be that, 
if the vacancy rate is lower than natural vacancy, making it difficult to adjust since the 
minimum vacancy rate is zero, and it can not be negative.  There is actually a 
theoretical boundary for the vacancy adjustment.  As Grade A offices have the lowest 
average vacancy rate for the observation period, this limitation may also cause stick 
vacancy rate for Grade A offices. 
 
Apart from transaction cost discussed in the previous sections, four additional reasons 
are provided here which may also contribute to the difference of rental and vacancy 
adjustment among different sub-markets.  Due to the ambiguity of the definitions of 
these aspects and the problems in quantification, it is difficult to determine the 
contribution of these factors to the empirical performance of different sub-markets.   
 
The data provided in the current study is not sufficient to differentiate the causes of 
the adjustment process.  Nonetheless, the model is useful to test whether or not 
differences exist in rent and vacancy adjustment across sub-markets. 
 
Chapter Summary 
The results of two models are shown in this chapter.  The first model has shown 
significant difference between Grade A and Grade C offices in rent and vacancy 
adjustment, but the result for Grade B offices does not seem to show consistency.  
Nevertheless, the test with the assumption of constant natural vacancy rate appears to 
fit better to the model than using the forecast vacancy rate.  Therefore, the long-run 
model with constant vacancy rate is adopted for the second mode. 
 
The second model is used to allow separate adjustment of both rent and vacancy rate.  
The result has shown significant rent adjustment of Grade A offices to external shock 
by 93% a year, greater than Grade B at 84%.  The rent adjustment is lowest for Grade 
C offices, with 21% a year.  Therefore, Hypothesis 1 can not be rejected. 
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 On the other hand, the vacancy rate of both Grade A and Grade B offices has shown 
little response to the market disequilibrium, but the vacancy rate of Grade C offices 
adjusts significantly to the external shock.  Hypothesis 2 can not be rejected either. 
 
Given the empirical evidence, neither hypothesis can be rejected.  Therefore, in the 
case of high-end offices which bear lower transaction cost, rental levels are more 
responsive to external shocks, vacancy rates of which are less responsive.  The 
adjustment process is on the contrary for low-end offices which have higher 
transaction costs. 
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 VII  Conclusion 
While almost all of the previous studies in the property market are carried under the 
assumption of efficient market, which is far from the reality, this dissertation fills in 
the research gap of the empirical study under the background of market inefficiency 
by conducting the research in terms of the impact of transaction cost on the 
adjustment process in office market.   
 
With the data in Hong Kong office market covering the period from 1981 to 2007, the 
rental and vacancy adjustment of each sub-market is studied.  Both hypotheses 
proposed in the study can not be rejected.  With different levels of transaction costs, 
the rental and vacancy adjustment appear to respond accordingly. 
 
Summary of Findings 
When the market is free of transaction cost, the rental price will adjust to a new 
equilibrium level immediately under external shocks, while vacancy rate will always 
equal the natural vacancy rate.  In reality, transaction cost is always positive, causing 
different response of rental and vacancy adjustment.  Given that natural vacancy rate 
do not fluctuate significantly, observed changes in vacancy rate over time is actually 
caused by the existence of transaction cost. 
 
The transaction cost in the office market mainly comes from two sources, one is the 
information asymmetry, and the other is the search cost. 
 
Tenants in low-end offices are mainly small and medium enterprises, who have higher 
default risk compared with those in high-end offices.  Thus it is more difficult for the 
landlords to determine the quality of tenants in low-end offices.  On the other hand, 
the “land value” takes higher portion in the high-end office rents, leaving less 
uncertainty in the structure element.  Thus the quality of the high-end office building 
can be more easily observed by the potential tenants.  Given the two phenomena, the 
information asymmetry is more obvious in the case of low-end offices.  The search 
cost for low-end offices are also higher due to the more heterogeneous group of 
potential tenants than that of high-end offices. 
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Given the higher rental level and larger unit size in rental transaction in high-end 
market, the transaction cost is lower per unit rental space for high-end market than 
low-end market.  Therefore, the vacancy rate should be more responsive to external 
shocks for low-end offices, while the rental price should be more sensitive for high-
end offices. 
 
The theoretical analysis is tested by two models, Hendershott et al. (2002) and 
Englund et al. (2008), using data from Hong Kong’s office sub-markets. The 
empirical results have shown the differences in rental and vacancy adjustments, which 
is consistent with the theoretical analysis.  For low-end offices in Hong Kong, namely 
Grade C offices, the vacancy rate are more responsive to demand and supply changes, 
while the rental prices appear to be more sensitive for high-end offices, namely Grade 
A ones.  Grade B office appears to be a transition of the performance of Grade A and 
Grade C market.   
 
Generally speaking, the vacancy rate is stickier in Hong Kong compared with other 
cities and regions.  Rent adjustment plays the major role during demand change for 
Grade A and B markets, while vacancy contributes significantly only in Grade C 
office market. 
 
Practical Implications 
As the office market is crucial for both the investors and the users, the findings of this 
study can be applied by both parties. 
 
For the investors, the understanding of rental and vacancy adjustment helps them to 
project the future changes of rental and vacancy levels more accurately and thus the 
more certain cash inflow, which assists the decision making in the investment. 
 
The users, with a better understanding of the adjustment, can negotiate with the 
landlord on certain terms in the tenancy agreement.  With a more accurate estimate of 
future rental and vacancy levels, the users can have a better understanding of the cost 
and expenses in the future, thus making other business decisions. 
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Apart from the participants in the market, the findings also help the policy makers, 
especially the government, to understand the market and take certain measures.  With 
the understanding of the impact of transaction cost on the rent and vacancy adjustment, 
the government can also make better assessment of their policies as most of these 
policies resulted in an increase in transaction costs. 
 
In addition, the paper highlights the importance of study the office market by 
segmentation.  According to Dowall (1988), market segmentation techniques can be 
useful for assessing product opportunities, gauging potential competition and 
determining the particular character of a product.  The benefits include providing 
more responsive products, enabling better target marketing, leading to mare accurate 
assessment of competition, and helping identify new opportunities.  
 
Limitations of This Study 
The current study has analyzed and deduced the how differences in transaction cost 
affect the rental and vacancy adjustment varies for different sub-markets.  However, 
other factors might lead to the same phenomenon, such as the substitution effect, 
knock-on effect, moving cost effect, the theoretical boundary of the natural level of 
vacancy rate, etc.  Due to the limited data, the current study can not determine 
whether the transaction cost takes the sole responsibility of causing the difference in 
rental and vacancy adjustment.  With more empirical data, the contribution of these 
factors can be isolated. 
 
Suggestions on Further Studies 
The analysis above has given out an idea that, when the transaction cost is different, 
the response of adjustment varies accordingly.  This conclusion can be generalized 
into other markets. 
 
For example, when housing market is considered, such idea can be reasonably formed 
that sub-markets with higher transaction cost, usually those not efficient enough and 
have little information available in the market, will have greater vacancy rate changes.  
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 Luxury houses may probably fall into this category.  For sub-markets with lower 
transaction cost, usually those units with medium size and average quality, the rental 
adjustment will take the lead and the vacancy rate is relatively stable. 
 
Such study can also be conducted for markets by regions.  As mentioned in the 
analysis before, the transaction cost in Hong Kong office market is relatively lower 
than that in Stockholm, thus the rental adjustment is more active in Hong Kong 
market.  The transaction cost varies among different regions and countries.  For 
example, when mainland China is studied, which is well-known for her limited 
published information and governmental control, the transaction cost should be much 
higher, and the vacancy rate should also be more volatile.  
 
Besides, it is suggested that research by segmentation should be encouraged in the 
future, so as to gain a better understanding of the behavior of the market. 
 
Apart from the focus on transaction cost, other reasons are possible for causing the 
difference among the sub-markets, like the moving cost effect, the impact of 
ownership, the substitution effect, the theoretical boundary of natural vacancy rate, 
and so forth.  Given the length and data available of the current study, it is not allowed 
to differentiate the causes or determine the contribution of these factors to the 
empirical performance of different sub-markets.  A natural extension of this study is 
to collect more data and isolate the effects of these factors. 
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IX  Appendices 
Appendix 1 Rental Indices (1999 = 100) 
Year 
Q/ 
M A B C 
1981  64.3 68.4 66.9 
1982  61.4 69.0 63.9 
1983  47.9 49.0 49.6 
1984  43.9 40.9 45.0 
1985  43.6 41.7 45.9 
1986 Q1 48.8 48.6 51.3 
 Q2 51.4 47.9 50.9 
 Q3 53.1 48.5 49.9 
 Q4 60.6 50.9 52.3 
1987 Q1 64.7 56.0 54.5 
 Q2 65.5 61.0 56.4 
 Q3 76.7 68.4 61.6 
 Q4 82.3 69.2 71.0 
1988 Q1 78.6 74.4 70.2 
 Q2 76.3 82.9 73.6 
 Q3 85.7 87.0 77.3 
 Q4 95.2 99.7 91.0 
1989 Q1 120.3 121.0 103.9 
 Q2 138.6 142.4 128.8 
 Q3 140.3 156.8 133.1 
 Q4 143.2 156.8 136.9 
1990 Q1 141.9 146.0 134.9 
 Q2 139.1 143.8 131.2 
 Q3 135.1 140.2 130.9 
 Q4 133.6 135.1 124.7 
1991 Q1 129.7 136.3 125.0 
 Q2 123.8 134.3 125.0 
 Q3 122.1 135.4 127.5 
 Q4 126.5 137.2 128.3 
1992 Q1 125.7 141.3 132.4 
 Q2 130.1 139.9 135.7 
 Q3 131.8 146.5 135.9 
 Q4 135.5 147.8 139.7 
1993 1 140.7 147.9 141.4 
 2 135.6 150.7 145.3 
 3 137.1 149.9 148.4 
 4 142.2 156.2 147.2 
 5 141.4 155.2 145.3 
 6 144.1 155.8 144.6 
 7 150.6 157.5 149.2 
 8 150.1 156.9 147.2 
 9 151.3 159.8 144.6 
 10 150.2 160.4 150.4 
 11 157.0 163.4 151.9 
 12 155.0 165.0 154.6 
1994 1 161.2 170.4 159.3 
 2 170.0 173.8 160.1 
 3 172.3 176.1 162.4 
 4 179.8 179.9 165.5 
 5 182.4 186.1 167.8 
 6 184.5 187.8 171.7 
 7 187.4 190.7 169.4 
 8 193.1 193.3 173.9 
 9 193.3 195.6 171.5 
 10 194.1 195.9 179.1 
 11 197.5 194.9 174.3 
  12 197.7 195.6 177.8 
1995 1 196.7 194.4 174.9 
 2 196.5 194.2 177.4 
 3 192.2 191.3 175.3 
 4 187.1 187.7 172.4 
 5 185.2 184.8 174.4 
 6 180.3 184.1 171.3 
 7 184.0 182.3 167.0 
 8 177.7 178.1 167.8 
 9 177.5 175.8 165.5 
 10 166.8 169.3 160.7 
 11 168.3 167.5 157.0 
 12 165.8 168.2 157.7 
1996 1 155.1 162.1 153.2 
 2 155.9 159.1 152.2 
 3 154.3 160.7 152.1 
 4 149.5 153.2 147.8 
 5 150.4 151.6 145.1 
 6 153.2 153.6 148.5 
 7 148.3 153.0 146.4 
 8 150.2 153.6 147.7 
 9 152.8 150.3 147.8 
 10 149.1 155.4 145.8 
 11 152.9 154.1 150.3 
 12 150.1 155.9 148.8 
1997 1 152.4 155.1 148.4 
 2 154.4 158.8 145.9 
 3 152.4 158.1 150.3 
 4 155.6 162.6 152.7 
 5 155.6 161.3 152.6 
 6 157.8 160.3 151.9 
 7 157.1 160.1 151.9 
 8 156.2 163.1 151.1 
 9 163.2 157.2 151.3 
 10 159.4 159.8 150.0 
 11 160.3 161.7 151.1 
 12 161.6 159.8 150.4 
1998 1 161.2 159.4 148.2 
 2 156.3 158.1 140.7 
 3 151.7 150.2 137.0 
 4 151.7 148.1 136.1 
 5 146.0 145.0 133.2 
 6 141.8 139.3 129.4 
 7 136.3 135.6 124.9 
 8 132.7 127.7 121.3 
 9 125.1 122.3 117.2 
 10 125.1 119.3 114.5 
 11 117.3 115.4 111.7 
 12 114.3 110.2 112.7 
1999 1 110.1 108.9 107.2 
 2 109.7 103.7 106.4 
 3 104.9 102.7 103.7 
 4 100.5 99.5 101.2 
 5 97.9 100.7 101.3 
 6 98.8 98.8 98.0 
 7 98.3 98.5 96.3 
 8 96.1 96.8 97.1 
 9 94.9 96.6 97.1 
 10 95.9 97.9 97.6 
 11 95.6 97.5 97.8 
 12 97.3 98.2 96.3 
2000 Q1 96.9 92.3 94.1 
 Q2 100.5 93.8 95.8 
 Q3 101.6 94.9 94.6 
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 Q4 104.0 99.5 96.3 
2001 Q1 109.1 100.3 95.2 
 Q2 107.9 98.8 94.4 
 Q3 104.6 98.0 92.7 
 Q4 98.4 93.8 90.4 
2002 Q1 91.3 88.6 86.8 
 Q2 86.5 84.5 84.2 
 Q3 84.6 83.6 82.8 
 Q4 81.7 84.7 82.6 
2003 Q1 78.5 81.0 79.3 
 Q2 73.3 76.0 74.8 
 Q3 69.8 73.5 74.3 
 Q4 71.8 74.7 74.7 
2004 Q1 73.2 76.0 75.8 
 Q2 75.3 78.8 78.7 
 Q3 78.7 80.2 78.4 
 Q4 81.4 83.9 81.4 
2005 Q1 89.6 86.5 83.8 
 Q2 95.1 91.4 87.8 
 Q3 104.4 96.7 90.6 
 Q4 111.1 101.6 92.6 
2006 Q1 117.2 105.5 93.6 
 Q2 125.5 112.8 87.7 
 Q3 128.1 115.4 101.2 
 Q4 127.8 118.2 103.8 
2007 1 133.9 119.7 104.2 
 2 133.9 123.9 107.1 
 3 134.4 123.9 108.1 
 4 135.7 124.2 108.4 
 5 137.4 128.2 110.2 
 6 140.2 128.5 110.5 
 7 140.8 128.8 111.7 
 8 142.3 129.8 113.6 
 9 142.2 132.2 115.9 
 10 144.7 134.3 118.2 
 11 146.0 135.9 119.1 
 12 149.2 137.9 117.8 
 
 
 Appendix 2 Private Consumption Expenditure 
Year Quarter Current At 2006
Q1 24,245  66,718  
Q2 24,423  65,979  
Q3 25,697  66,351  
1981 
Q4 28,423  71,628  
Q1 28,647  70,985  
Q2 27,445  66,838  
Q3 30,830  72,929  
1982 
Q4 32,169  74,339  
Q1 32,914  75,818  
Q2 32,440  74,024  
Q3 35,308  78,081  
1983 
Q4 37,606  79,347  
Q1 38,525  80,399  
Q2 37,005  77,024  
Q3 40,735  83,152  
1984 
Q4 41,578  84,349  
Q1 40,900  83,138  
Q2 40,426  81,721  
Q3 42,850  84,795  
1985 
Q4 45,211  88,980  
Q1 45,951  89,469  
Q2 44,953  86,718  
Q3 49,045  93,204  
1986 
Q4 52,194  97,879  
Q1 52,791  97,770  
Q2 53,941  98,698  
Q3 57,130  103,430 
1987 
Q4 60,158  106,383 
Q1 62,146  108,038 1988 
Q2 61,823  105,851 
Q3 66,398  112,092 
Q4 71,387  118,025 
Q1 72,469  115,550 
Q2 70,906  110,645 
Q3 74,726  115,343 
1989 
Q4 78,502  118,992 
Q1 78,916  116,381 
Q2 81,293  117,432 
Q3 88,531  125,989 
1990 
Q4 93,428  129,909 
Q1 92,972  125,334 
Q2 96,731  128,393 
Q3 106,264  139,653 
1991 
Q4 110,499  141,974 
Q1 109,065  136,959 
Q2 113,336  139,432 
Q3 123,440  150,767 
1992 
Q4 126,957  152,820 
Q1 124,234  147,364 
Q2 130,267  151,662 
Q3 137,501  158,547 
1993 
Q4 149,080  167,456 
Q1 146,736  162,416 
Q2 150,316  160,812 
Q3 156,553  165,514 
1994 
Q4 170,804  176,221 
Q1 164,017  165,746 
Q2 168,964  165,245 
Q3 171,717  166,589 
1995 
Q4 187,010  178,946 
1996 Q1 178,456  170,164 
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 Q2 181,815  168,713 
Q3 187,929  174,121 
Q4 207,308  188,514 
Q1 195,006  176,863 
Q2 205,712  182,021 
Q3 212,727  188,112 
1997 
Q4 220,380  192,895 
Q1 195,497  173,465 
Q2 200,275  174,680 
Q3 197,208  172,739 
1998 
Q4 202,968  177,996 
Q1 183,509  166,729 
Q2 194,170  176,870 
Q3 189,575  177,650 
1999 
Q4 197,994  186,009 
Q1 189,748  179,533 
Q2 195,205  186,264 
Q3 191,987  185,053 
2000 
Q4 200,201  192,152 
Q1 192,962  185,515 
Q2 200,003  192,258 
Q3 193,623  187,706 
2001 
Q4 196,396  191,076 
2002 Q1 187,941  186,455 
Q2 189,319  188,797 
Q3 184,787  186,048 
Q4 186,355  188,570 
Q1 177,704  179,821 
Q2 174,894  179,810 
Q3 178,035  185,653 
2003 
Q4 189,240  194,710 
Q1 185,559  190,793 
Q2 192,688  199,133 
Q3 188,753  195,096 
2004 
Q4 200,923  206,688 
Q1 192,172  196,566 
Q2 200,770  203,197 
Q3 199,943  201,715 
2005 
Q4 212,051  213,985 
Q1 206,983  208,569 
Q2 218,322  217,922 
Q3 210,681  210,994 
2006 
Q4 228,430  226,931 
Q1 220,360  217,880 
Q2 238,030  232,375 
Q3 241,639  233,333 
2007 
Q4 266,045  248,505 
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 Appendix 3 Private Office – Stock at Year End 
Year A B C 
1980 1,119,700 734,300 579,700 
1981 1,283,818 803,823 648,160 
1982 1,580,400 921,900 729,700 
1983 1,969,900 1,069,300 811,300 
1984 2,030,400 1,148,100 889,100 
1985 2,235,400 1,221,400 919,000 
1986 2,242,400 1,234,400 937,400 
1987 2,191,400 1,257,400 971,600 
1988 2,413,400 1,265,900 978,100 
1989 2,621,000 1,290,000 985,800 
1990 2,771,800 1,227,000 1,086,400 
1991 3,050,500 1,370,500 1,120,800 
1992 3,390,200 1,508,100 1,200,800 
1993 3,540,300 1,648,800 1,247,000 
1994 3,871,600 1,705,100 1,284,500 
1995 4,118,300 1,757,600 1,312,700 
1996 4,274,900 1,795,000 1,317,700 
1997 4,626,700 1,866,000 1,396,600 
1998 5,253,600 1,931,800 1,418,100 
1999 5,194,000 2,199,500 1,594,700 
2000 5,138,000 2,315,300 1,622,100 
2001 5,150,300 2,384,000 1,597,600 
2002 5,257,300 2,421,900 1,607,300 
2003 5,482,500 2,451,400 1,605,300 
2004 5,753,200 2,440,600 1,601,100 
2005 5,732,200 2,452,100 1,585,400 
2006 5,799,200 2,428,800 1,584,800 
2007 5,937,050 2,447,000 1,575,700 
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 Appendix 4 Private Office – Vacancy Rate at Year End 
Year A B C 
1980 12.55% 3.64% 6.16% 
1981 12.46% 7.14% 13.04% 
1982 14.60% 21.10% 16.50% 
1983 20.20% 23.90% 17.00% 
1984 10.30% 19.50% 14.30% 
1985 6.90% 18.10% 11.70% 
1986 3.10% 9.60% 8.40% 
1987 6.40% 4.40% 4.60% 
1988 3.50% 1.80% 1.70% 
1989 6.50% 4.00% 4.00% 
1990 4.70% 7.90% 7.10% 
1991 9.20% 11.20% 6.60% 
1992 10.20% 10.10% 7.40% 
1993 4.80% 10.30% 7.20% 
1994 10.20% 10.20% 8.00% 
1995 7.90% 11.20% 11.60% 
1996 8.30% 14.60% 15.80% 
1997 8.80% 13.10% 18.00% 
1998 15.30% 15.50% 18.70% 
1999 12.90% 15.00% 16.30% 
2000 8.70% 11.10% 13.90% 
2001 8.70% 13.10% 15.80% 
2002 10.80% 14.60% 15.80% 
2003 13.70% 13.80% 15.20% 
2004 13.10% 12.10% 11.70% 
2005 8.10% 9.20% 10.50% 
2006 7.60% 6.70% 9.30% 
2007 9.70% 7.30% 8.40% 
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 Appendix 5 Employment at Year End 
Year A B 
 Fina IRE medical/dental Sum 
1980 65,344 65,592 21,372 86,964 
1981 76,275 77,658 22,776 100,434 
1982 78,591 86,733 24,575 111,308 
1983 73,719 87,238 25,667 112,905 
1984 75,723 93,149 26,312 119,461 
1985 78,440 101,905 27,217 129,122 
1986 82,612 111,075 27,927 139,002 
1987 90,299 121,613 28,230 149,843 
1988 97,885 137,195 29,127 166,322 
1989 102,796 151,545 30,516 182,061 
1990 108,954 167,091 31,633 198,724 
1991 113,784 181,440 37,569 219,009 
1992 117,869 196,168 43,861 240,029 
1993 125,795 211,523 48,222 259,745 
1994 132,089 236,808 54,531 291,339 
1995 133,931 243,692 59,412 303,104 
1996 138,238 256,653 61,418 318,071 
1997 141,288 268,378 64,594 332,972 
1998 130,159 259,093 67,830 326,923 
1999 136,800 277,503 68,543 346,046 
2000 134,113 299,992 67,572 367,564 
2001 133,813 298,828 73,078 371,906 
2002 124,571 315,797 74,684 390,481 
2003 120,715 302,239 73,088 375,327 
2004 122,359 324,323 75,806 400,129 
2005 128,235 335,305 77,282 412,587 
2006 138,630 352,117 80,731 432,848 
2007 149,738 366,704 85,676 452,380 
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 Year C 
 IRE 
medical/ 
dental 
Text 
Print/ 
pub 
Sanitary 
services 
Busi/ prof/ 
labour 
Assoc 
Others Sum 
1980 65,592 21,372 127,609 27,266 10,164 2,121 4,206 258,330
1981 77,658 22,776 122,623 28,513 12,335 2,337 5,842 272,084
1982 86,733 24,575 111,871 28,477 15,215 2,852 5,886 275,609
1983 87,238 25,667 111,344 27,357 14,652 2,487 6,470 275,215
1984 93,149 26,312 117,356 29,554 16,812 2,658 6,550 292,391
1985 101,905 27,217 110,606 30,809 17,990 2,536 7,169 298,232
1986 111,075 27,927 116,334 32,049 16,565 2,444 7,591 313,985
1987 121,613 28,230 119,081 32,718 19,734 2,592 7,129 331,097
1988 137,195 29,127 116,509 35,800 21,641 2,609 7,726 350,607
1989 151,545 30,516 113,487 35,353 24,896 2,488 8,355 366,640
1990 167,091 31,633 110,353 37,577 25,201 2,688 6,271 380,814
1991 181,440 37,569 94,073 38,791 31,285 2,998 6,435 392,591
1992 196,168 43,861 81,914 40,988 26,888 3,024 6,466 399,309
1993 211,523 48,222 71,465 40,160 26,283 2,951 5,232 405,836
1994 236,808 54,531 67,751 42,029 33,102 3,640 6,392 444,253
1995 243,692 59,412 58,789 43,505 32,686 3,315 5,161 446,560
1996 256,653 61,418 47,658 43,729 40,080 2,937 5,319 457,794
1997 268,378 64,594 40,790 44,642 30,581 3,336 5,616 457,937
1998 259,093 67,830 32,675 42,007 36,481 3,608 4,330 446,024
1999 277,503 68,543 30,836 44,356 39,970 3,803 4,912 469,923
2000 299,992 67,572 27,489 43,849 45,793 3,500 5,240 493,435
2001 298,828 73,078 26,617 44,050 48,098 3,405 5,727 499,803
2002 315,797 74,684 25,416 39,981 52,922 3,496 6,079 518,375
2003 302,239 73,088 20,324 37,945 57,772 3,474 5,640 500,482
2004 324,323 75,806 20,005 36,831 57,364 3,453 6,375 524,157
2005 335,305 77,282 20,164 37,405 58,218 3,220 5,189 536,783
2006 352,117 80,731 18,758 38,795 60,373 3,325 5,918 560,017
2007 366,704 85,676 17,037 38,563 57,996 3,431 5,831 575,238
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 Appendix 6 Forecasted Vacancy Rate 
Grade A 
Dependent Variable: VACANCYA 
Method: Least Squares 
Sample(adjusted): 1982 2007 
Included observations: 26 after adjusting endpoints 
Convergence achieved after 16 iterations 
Backcast: 1981 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 0.095732 0.012627 7.581792 0.0000 
AR(1) 0.485884 0.183588 2.646602 0.0144 
MA(1) 0.974662 0.078642 12.39366 0.0000 
R-squared 0.744115     Mean dependent var 0.094454 
Adjusted R-squared 0.721864     S.D. dependent var 0.033853 
S.E. of regression 0.017854     Akaike info criterion -5.105040 
Sum squared resid 0.007331     Schwarz criterion -4.959875 
Log likelihood 69.36552     F-statistic 33.44198 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.881510     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
Inverted AR Roots        .49 
Inverted MA Roots       -.97 
 
Grade B 
Dependent Variable: VACANCYB 
Method: Least Squares 
Sample(adjusted): 1982 2007 
Included observations: 26 after adjusting endpoints 
Convergence achieved after 93 iterations 
Backcast: 1981 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 0.138888 0.018279 7.598151 0.0000 
AR(1) 0.533996 0.144847 3.686608 0.0012 
MA(1) 1.364976 0.341120 4.001457 0.0006 
R-squared 0.880528     Mean dependent var 0.118969 
Adjusted R-squared 0.870139     S.D. dependent var 0.047802 
S.E. of regression 0.017226     Akaike info criterion -5.176641 
Sum squared resid 0.006825     Schwarz criterion -5.031476 
Log likelihood 70.29633     F-statistic 84.75690 
Durbin-Watson stat 0.526950     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
Inverted AR Roots        .53 
Inverted MA Roots       -1.36 
 Estimated MA process is noninvertible 
 
Grade C 
Dependent Variable: VACANCYC 
Method: Least Squares 
Sample(adjusted): 1982 2007 
Included observations: 26 after adjusting endpoints 
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 Convergence achieved after 9 iterations 
Backcast: 1981 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 0.095667 0.044568 2.146517 0.0426 
AR(1) 0.884891 0.101668 8.703737 0.0000 
MA(1) 0.975045 0.027785 35.09260 0.0000 
R-squared 0.934819     Mean dependent var 0.114546 
Adjusted R-squared 0.929151     S.D. dependent var 0.046108 
S.E. of regression 0.012273     Akaike info criterion -5.854712 
Sum squared resid 0.003464     Schwarz criterion -5.709547 
Log likelihood 79.11125     F-statistic 164.9306 
Durbin-Watson stat 0.852079     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
Inverted AR Roots        .88 
Inverted MA Roots       -.98 
 
Summary 
 A B C 
1981 0.125100 0.053900 0.096000 
1982 0.113212 0.093505 0.129132 
1983 0.136486 0.205225 0.159815 
1984 0.170325 0.211863 0.166725 
1985 0.105941 0.187611 0.139528 
1986 0.071567 0.165644 0.116758 
1987 0.052491 0.101629 0.084091 
1988 0.067433 0.058929 0.049915 
1989 0.055791 0.043154 0.020931 
1990 0.067868 0.060888 0.043612 
1991 0.064860 0.094600 0.071715 
1992 0.087509 0.116947 0.068492 
1993 0.105599 0.107333 0.074424 
1994 0.055835 0.111910 0.074220 
1995 0.104338 0.106612 0.079999 
1996 0.079703 0.122389 0.115283 
1997 0.089838 0.142631 0.153417 
1998 0.086532 0.133041 0.175753 
1999 0.140874 0.154677 0.180944 
2000 0.117850 0.143185 0.160073 
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 2001 0.092092 0.117094 0.135784 
2002 0.086526 0.134667 0.154817 
2003 0.107287 0.143912 0.153929 
2004 0.123566 0.137940 0.149215 
2005 0.124496 0.122355 0.115682 
2006 0.082694 0.099952 0.104669 
2007 0.083272 0.079259 0.093088 
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 Appendix 7 Regression Result – Model 1 with Constant Vacancy 
Grade A 
Dependent Variable: LOG(RENTA/PCED) 
Method: Least Squares 
Sample: 1981 2007 
Included observations: 27 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C -5.134991 1.891139 -2.715290 0.0121 
LOG(EMPLOYA) 2.817643 0.350948 8.028654 0.0000 
LOG(STOCKA) -1.512535 0.175152 -8.635561 0.0000 
R-squared 0.756526     Mean dependent var 4.833831 
Adjusted R-squared 0.736236     S.D. dependent var 0.300607 
S.E. of regression 0.154386     Akaike info criterion -0.794286 
Sum squared resid 0.572039     Schwarz criterion -0.650304 
Log likelihood 13.72286     F-statistic 37.28650 
Durbin-Watson stat 0.708235     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
 
Dependent Variable: DLOG(RENTA/PCED) 
Method: Least Squares 
Sample(adjusted): 1982 2007 
Included observations: 26 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C -0.006401 0.043122 -0.148448 0.8833 
DLOG(EMPLOYA) 3.548858 0.837400 4.237951 0.0003 
DLOG(STOCKA) -1.666644 0.463432 -3.596310 0.0016 
C_A7_EC(-1) -0.486618 0.227043 -2.143283 0.0434 
R-squared 0.584193     Mean dependent var -0.008781 
Adjusted R-squared 0.527492     S.D. dependent var 0.177029 
S.E. of regression 0.121688     Akaike info criterion -1.234067 
Sum squared resid 0.325778     Schwarz criterion -1.040514 
Log likelihood 20.04288     F-statistic 10.30304 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.792136     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000195 
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 Grade B 
Dependent Variable: LOG(RENTB/PCED) 
Method: Least Squares 
Sample: 1981 2007 
Included observations: 27 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 27.28708 2.442182 11.17324 0.0000 
LOG(EMPLOYB) 2.225741 0.277867 8.010084 0.0000 
LOG(STOCKB) -3.498556 0.395725 -8.840881 0.0000 
R-squared 0.779313     Mean dependent var 4.832038 
Adjusted R-squared 0.760922     S.D. dependent var 0.332965 
S.E. of regression 0.162805     Akaike info criterion -0.688086 
Sum squared resid 0.636132     Schwarz criterion -0.544104 
Log likelihood 12.28916     F-statistic 42.37563 
Durbin-Watson stat 0.736733     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
 
Dependent Variable: DLOG(RENTB/PCED) 
Method: Least Squares 
Sample(adjusted): 1982 2007 
Included observations: 26 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C -0.089847 0.053504 -1.679250 0.1073 
DLOG(EMPLOYB) 4.583751 0.989959 4.630243 0.0001 
DLOG(STOCKB) -4.491394 0.806293 -5.570426 0.0000 
C_B7_EC(-1) -0.719783 0.229396 -3.137729 0.0048 
R-squared 0.636847     Mean dependent var -0.014340 
Adjusted R-squared 0.587326     S.D. dependent var 0.180452 
S.E. of regression 0.115922     Akaike info criterion -1.331168 
Sum squared resid 0.295632     Schwarz criterion -1.137615 
Log likelihood 21.30519     F-statistic 12.86017 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.524227     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000046 
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 Grade C 
Dependent Variable: LOG(RENTC/PCED) 
Method: Least Squares 
Sample: 1981 2007 
Included observations: 27 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 7.367324 2.722057 2.706528 0.0123 
LOG(EMPLOYC) 2.411320 0.876230 2.751925 0.0111 
LOG(STOCKC) -2.409529 0.724312 -3.326647 0.0028 
R-squared 0.394599     Mean dependent var 4.788431 
Adjusted R-squared 0.344148     S.D. dependent var 0.298323 
S.E. of regression 0.241596     Akaike info criterion 0.101340 
Sum squared resid 1.400847     Schwarz criterion 0.245321 
Log likelihood 1.631915     F-statistic 7.821558 
Durbin-Watson stat 0.157375     Prob(F-statistic) 0.002424 
 
Dependent Variable: DLOG(RENTC/PCED) 
Method: Least Squares 
Sample(adjusted): 1982 2007 
Included observations: 26 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C -0.073757 0.039113 -1.885758 0.0726 
DLOG(EMPLOYC) 4.580534 0.993586 4.610102 0.0001 
DLOG(STOCKC) -2.159706 0.496088 -4.353475 0.0003 
C_C7_EC(-1) -0.091959 0.077724 -1.183145 0.2494 
R-squared 0.667319     Mean dependent var -0.018880 
Adjusted R-squared 0.621953     S.D. dependent var 0.144783 
S.E. of regression 0.089021     Akaike info criterion -1.859254 
Sum squared resid 0.174344     Schwarz criterion -1.665700 
Log likelihood 28.17030     F-statistic 14.70979 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.519034     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000018 
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 Appendix 8 Regression Result – Model 1 with Forecast Vacancy 
Grade A 
Dependent Variable: LOG(RENTA/PCED) 
Method: Least Squares 
Sample: 1981 2007 
Included observations: 27 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C -5.759102 2.337627 -2.463653 0.0213 
LOG(EMPLOYA) 2.846601 0.440416 6.463435 0.0000 
LOG(1-
VACANCYAF)+LOG(
STOCKA) 
-1.503554 0.218351 -6.885953 0.0000 
R-squared 0.663943     Mean dependent var 4.833831 
Adjusted R-squared 0.635938     S.D. dependent var 0.300607 
S.E. of regression 0.181379     Akaike info criterion -0.472016 
Sum squared resid 0.789561     Schwarz criterion -0.328034 
Log likelihood 9.372217     F-statistic 23.70820 
Durbin-Watson stat 0.646261     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000002 
 
Dependent Variable: DLOG(RENTA/PCED) 
Method: Least Squares 
Sample(adjusted): 1982 2007 
Included observations: 26 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C -0.036091 0.043872 -0.822653 0.4195 
DLOG(EMPLOYA) 4.213453 0.949965 4.435378 0.0002 
DLOG(1-
VACANCYAF)+DLO
G(STOCKA) 
-1.443704 0.538412 -2.681410 0.0136 
F_A7_EC(-1) -0.523115 0.215367 -2.428948 0.0238 
R-squared 0.504671     Mean dependent var -0.008781 
Adjusted R-squared 0.437126     S.D. dependent var 0.177029 
S.E. of regression 0.132816     Akaike info criterion -1.059067 
Sum squared resid 0.388082     Schwarz criterion -0.865513 
Log likelihood 17.76787     F-statistic 7.471630 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.784971     Prob(F-statistic) 0.001258 
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 Grade B 
Dependent Variable: LOG(RENTB/PCED) 
Method: Least Squares 
Sample: 1981 2007 
Included observations: 27 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 20.54859 4.949857 4.151350 0.0004 
LOG(EMPLOYB) 1.511340 0.592265 2.551797 0.0175 
LOG(1-
VACANCYBF)+LOG(
STOCKB) 
-2.430465 0.842864 -2.883580 0.0082 
R-squared 0.302317     Mean dependent var 4.832038 
Adjusted R-squared 0.244177     S.D. dependent var 0.332965 
S.E. of regression 0.289473     Akaike info criterion 0.462933 
Sum squared resid 2.011077     Schwarz criterion 0.606915 
Log likelihood -3.249595     F-statistic 5.199787 
Durbin-Watson stat 0.504761     Prob(F-statistic) 0.013301 
 
Dependent Variable: DLOG(RENTB/PCED) 
Method: Least Squares 
Sample(adjusted): 1982 2007 
Included observations: 26 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C -0.167695 0.088180 -1.901728 0.0704 
DLOG(EMPLOYB) 3.170525 1.811650 1.750075 0.0940 
DLOG(1-
VACANCYBF)+DLO
G(STOCKB) 
-0.864856 1.473792 -0.586824 0.5633 
F_B7_EC(-1) -0.239917 0.230055 -1.042869 0.3083 
R-squared 0.144459     Mean dependent var -0.014340 
Adjusted R-squared 0.027795     S.D. dependent var 0.180452 
S.E. of regression 0.177926     Akaike info criterion -0.474259 
Sum squared resid 0.696469     Schwarz criterion -0.280706 
Log likelihood 10.16537     F-statistic 1.238243 
Durbin-Watson stat 0.811470     Prob(F-statistic) 0.319723 
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 Grade C 
Dependent Variable: LOG(RENTC/PCED) 
Method: Least Squares 
Sample: 1981 2007 
Included observations: 27 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 10.30453 3.245675 3.174851 0.0041 
LOG(EMPLOYC) -0.435422 1.127780 -0.386088 0.7028 
LOG(1-
VACANCYCF)+LOG(
STOCKC) 
0.007363 0.959332 0.007676 0.9939 
R-squared 0.115446     Mean dependent var 4.788431 
Adjusted R-squared 0.041733     S.D. dependent var 0.298323 
S.E. of regression 0.292032     Akaike info criterion 0.480532 
Sum squared resid 2.046783     Schwarz criterion 0.624514 
Log likelihood -3.487179     F-statistic 1.566153 
Durbin-Watson stat 0.273555     Prob(F-statistic) 0.229453 
 
Dependent Variable: DLOG(RENTC/PCED) 
Method: Least Squares 
Sample(adjusted): 1982 2007 
Included observations: 26 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C -0.127166 0.042023 -3.026075 0.0062 
DLOG(EMPLOYC) 5.635377 1.273473 4.425203 0.0002 
DLOG(1-
VACANCYCF)+DLO
G(STOCKC) 
-1.564234 0.674426 -2.319354 0.0301 
F_C7_EC(-1) -0.164975 0.076533 -2.155589 0.0423 
R-squared 0.521453     Mean dependent var -0.018880 
Adjusted R-squared 0.456196     S.D. dependent var 0.144783 
S.E. of regression 0.106768     Akaike info criterion -1.495683 
Sum squared resid 0.250786     Schwarz criterion -1.302130 
Log likelihood 23.44388     F-statistic 7.990817 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.479393     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000873 
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 Appendix 9 Regression Result – Model 2 – SUR 
Grade A 
System: SYS_A 
Estimation Method: Seemingly Unrelated Regression 
Sample: 1981 2007   
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C(11) -0.148993 0.081202 -1.834850 0.0716 
C(12) 0.419826 0.163525 2.567343 0.0128 
C(13) -1.213023 0.394598 -3.074074 0.0032 
C(14) 4.734454 0.706355 6.702654 0.0000 
C(15) 1.032635 0.701876 1.471249 0.1465 
C(16) -0.931853 0.206401 -4.514761 0.0000 
C(21) 0.042992 0.010283 4.180664 0.0001 
C(22) 0.289444 0.053494 5.410808 0.0000 
C(23) -0.404669 0.095920 -4.218825 0.0001 
C(24) -0.532596 0.095576 -5.572484 0.0000 
C(25) 0.019298 0.026527 0.727500 0.4698 
C(31) 0.101821 0.014669 6.941090 0.0000 
C(32) -0.584723 0.155403 -3.762619 0.0004 
C(33) 0.097830 0.033105 2.955169 0.0045 
Determinant residual covariance 6.55E-10   
Equation: DLOG(RENTA/PCED)= C(11)+C(12)*DLOG(RENTA(-
1)/PCED(-1)) 
        
+C(13)*DLOG(STOCKA)+C(14)*DLOG(EMPLOYA)+C(15)*VACANCYA
(-1)  
        +C(16)*C_A7_EC(-1) 
Observations: 25 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------- 
R-squared 0.704781     Mean dependent var -0.003282 
Adjusted R-squared 0.627092     S.D. dependent var 0.178400 
S.E. of regression 0.108942     Sum squared resid 0.225498 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.057798    
Equation: 
D(VACANCYA)=C(21)+C(22)*DLOG(STOCKA)+C(23)*DLOG(EMPLOY
A) 
        +C(24)*VACANCYA(-1)+C(25)*C_A7_EC(-1) 
Observations: 26 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------- 
R-squared 0.657672     Mean dependent var -0.001485 
Adjusted R-squared 0.592466     S.D. dependent var 0.024651 
S.E. of regression 0.015737     Sum squared resid 0.005201 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.143728    
Equation: DLOG(STOCKA)=C(31)+C(32)*VACANCYA(-
2)+C(33)*C_A7_EC(-5) 
Observations: 22 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------- 
R-squared 0.552804     Mean dependent var 0.046533 
Adjusted R-squared 0.505731     S.D. dependent var 0.034537 
S.E. of regression 0.024281     Sum squared resid 0.011202 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.874586    
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 Grade B 
System: SYS_B 
Estimation Method: Seemingly Unrelated Regression 
Sample: 1981 2007   
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C(11) -0.173507 0.097353 -1.782245 0.0799 
C(12) 0.264634 0.185312 1.428048 0.1586 
C(13) -4.270723 0.713892 -5.982308 0.0000 
C(14) 4.924494 0.920890 5.347536 0.0000 
C(15) 0.521389 0.634729 0.821435 0.4147 
C(16) -0.840855 0.227430 -3.697197 0.0005 
C(21) 0.069002 0.018817 3.667010 0.0005 
C(22) 0.837748 0.137048 6.112816 0.0000 
C(23) -0.578701 0.177893 -3.253080 0.0019 
C(24) -0.595941 0.111851 -5.328016 0.0000 
C(25) 0.037606 0.039315 0.956536 0.3427 
C(31) 0.025256 0.015338 1.646642 0.1049 
C(32) 0.054665 0.122665 0.445641 0.6575 
C(33) 0.111353 0.031427 3.543252 0.0008 
Determinant residual covariance 1.34E-09   
Equation: DLOG(RENTB/PCED)= C(11)+C(12)*DLOG(RENTB(-
1)/PCED(-1)) 
        
+C(13)*DLOG(STOCKB)+C(14)*DLOG(EMPLOYB)+C(15)*VACANCYB
(-1)  
        +C(16)*C_B7_EC(-1) 
Observations: 25 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------- 
R-squared 0.708678     Mean dependent var -0.011259 
Adjusted R-squared 0.632015     S.D. dependent var 0.183474 
S.E. of regression 0.111298     Sum squared resid 0.235359 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.822436    
Equation: 
D(VACANCYB)=C(21)+C(22)*DLOG(STOCKB)+C(23)*DLOG(EMPLOY
B) 
        +C(24)*VACANCYB(-1)+C(25)*C_B7_EC(-1) 
Observations: 26 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------- 
R-squared 0.639809     Mean dependent var 0.000619 
Adjusted R-squared 0.571201     S.D. dependent var 0.034454 
S.E. of regression 0.022561     Sum squared resid 0.010689 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.120672    
Equation: DLOG(STOCKB)=C(31)+C(32)*VACANCYB(-
2)+C(33)*C_B7_EC(-5) 
Observations: 22 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------- 
R-squared 0.405463     Mean dependent var 0.032970 
Adjusted R-squared 0.342880     S.D. dependent var 0.033156 
S.E. of regression 0.026877     Sum squared resid 0.013725 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.132664    
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 Grade C 
System: SYS_C 
Estimation Method: Seemingly Unrelated Regression 
Sample: 1981 2007   
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C(11) 0.158083 0.082600 1.913841 0.0605 
C(12) -0.146692 0.156572 -0.936900 0.3526 
C(13) -2.649621 0.509280 -5.202685 0.0000 
C(14) 3.022459 0.913921 3.307133 0.0016 
C(15) -1.509657 0.569671 -2.650052 0.0103 
C(16) -0.214525 0.080652 -2.659886 0.0100 
C(21) 0.026410 0.014339 1.841828 0.0705 
C(22) 0.291975 0.078439 3.722319 0.0004 
C(23) -0.605965 0.182977 -3.311701 0.0016 
C(24) -0.171152 0.090845 -1.883995 0.0645 
C(25) 0.035112 0.015600 2.250778 0.0281 
C(31) 0.047359 0.011991 3.949417 0.0002 
C(32) -0.227060 0.100234 -2.265296 0.0272 
C(33) 0.052854 0.021767 2.428140 0.0182 
Determinant residual covariance 3.16E-10   
Equation: DLOG(RENTC/PCED)= C(11)+C(12)*DLOG(RENTC(-
1)/PCED(-1)) 
        
+C(13)*DLOG(STOCKC)+C(14)*DLOG(EMPLOYC)+C(15)*VACANCYC
(-1)  
        +C(16)*C_C7_EC(-1) 
Observations: 25 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------- 
R-squared 0.729489     Mean dependent var -0.013797 
Adjusted R-squared 0.658302     S.D. dependent var 0.145382 
S.E. of regression 0.084983     Sum squared resid 0.137220 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.471005    
Equation: 
D(VACANCYC)=C(21)+C(22)*DLOG(STOCKC)+C(23)*DLOG(EMPLOY
C) 
        +C(24)*VACANCYC(-1)+C(25)*C_C7_EC(-1) 
Observations: 26 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------- 
R-squared 0.485706     Mean dependent var -0.000288 
Adjusted R-squared 0.387746     S.D. dependent var 0.023053 
S.E. of regression 0.018038     Sum squared resid 0.006833 
Durbin-Watson stat 0.903065    
Equation: DLOG(STOCKC)=C(31)+C(32)*VACANCYC(-
2)+C(33)*C_C7_EC(-5) 
Observations: 22 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------- 
R-squared 0.224525     Mean dependent var 0.025253 
Adjusted R-squared 0.142896     S.D. dependent var 0.025324 
S.E. of regression 0.023445     Sum squared resid 0.010444 
Durbin-Watson stat 0.846134    
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Appendix 10 Regression Result – Model 2 – Employment OLS 
Grade A 
Dependent Variable: DLOG(EMPLOYA) 
Method: Least Squares 
Sample(adjusted): 1983 2007 
Included observations: 25 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 0.009163 0.007322 1.251332 0.2234 
DLOG(EMPLOYA(-1)) 0.619655 0.158615 3.906662 0.0007 
R-squared 0.398882     Mean dependent var 0.024867 
Adjusted R-squared 0.372746     S.D. dependent var 0.038637 
S.E. of regression 0.030601     Akaike info criterion -4.058982 
Sum squared resid 0.021537     Schwarz criterion -3.961472 
Log likelihood 52.73728     F-statistic 15.26201 
Durbin-Watson stat 0.977660     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000709 
 
Grade B 
Dependent Variable: DLOG(EMPLOYB) 
Method: Least Squares 
Sample(adjusted): 1983 2007 
Included observations: 25 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 0.017788 0.009089 1.957119 0.0626 
DLOG(EMPLOYB(-1)) 0.654298 0.133982 4.883483 0.0001 
R-squared 0.509055     Mean dependent var 0.057219 
Adjusted R-squared 0.487709     S.D. dependent var 0.029150 
S.E. of regression 0.020864     Akaike info criterion -4.824992 
Sum squared resid 0.010012     Schwarz criterion -4.727482 
Log likelihood 62.31240     F-statistic 23.84840 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.424522     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000062 
 
Grade C 
Dependent Variable: DLOG(EMPLOYC) 
Method: Least Squares 
Sample(adjusted): 1983 2007 
Included observations: 25 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 0.016389 0.006412 2.555921 0.0177 
DLOG(EMPLOYC(-
1)) 
0.439338 0.187599 2.341901 0.0282 
R-squared 0.192543     Mean dependent var 0.029156 
Adjusted R-squared 0.157436     S.D. dependent var 0.018388 
S.E. of regression 0.016878     Akaike info criterion -5.248944 
Sum squared resid 0.006552     Schwarz criterion -5.151434 
Log likelihood 67.61180     F-statistic 5.484499 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.627626     Prob(F-statistic) 0.028212 
 
